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THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE TENTH CIRcurr: THREE
DECADES OF (MOSTLY) HARMLESS ERROR
DAVID B. KOPEL t
Since 1977, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided many
cases involving the Second Amendment. In light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,' it appears that the
Tenth Circuit was wrong in most of those cases. That is, the Circuit's
theory of the Second Amendment was that it only applies to a person
who is keeping or bearing arms while serving in a well-regulated militia.
Heller affirmed the Standard Model of the Second Amendment: 2 that the
Second Amendment is functionally similar to the First Amendment, and
to most of the rest of the Bill of Rights; and the right protects all law-
abiding citizens, not just a small number of people in government ser-
t Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado; Associate Policy Analyst,
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Author of THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY:
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? (1992). Coauthor of the
law school casebook GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS (2002). More information at
http://www.davekopel.org. The author appeared at the Supreme Court counsel table to assist the oral
argument on behalf of Mr. Heller in District of Columbia v. Heller. I would like to thank Stephen
Halbrook, Robert Dowlut, Michael P. O'Shea, and the commenters at the Volokh Conspiracy web-
log for helpful insights on this article.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2.
Perhaps surprisingly, what distinguishes the Second Amendment scholarship from that
relating to other constitutional rights, such as privacy or free speech, is that there appears
to be far more agreement on the general outlines of Second Amendment theory than ex-
ists in those other areas. Indeed, there is sufficient consensus on many issues that one can
properly speak of a "Standard Model" in Second Amendment theory, much as physicists
and cosmologists speak of a Standard Model" in terms of the creation and evolution of
the Universe. The picture that emerges from this scholarship is a coherent one, consistent
with both the text of the Constitution and what we know about the Framers' understand-
ing. The purpose of the right to bear arms is twofold: to allow individuals to protect
themselves and their families, and to ensure a body of armed citizenry from which a mili-
tia could be drawn, whether that militia's role was to protect the nation, or to protect the
people from a tyrannical government.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 463, 475
(1995) (footnote omitted). In the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, there were some scholars
who disputed the Standard Model. The most famous of these was Michael Bellesiles, whose 2000
book Arming America, The Origins of a National Gun Culture, was withdrawn by its publisher after
it was demonstrated to be a fraud. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE
STORY OF How AND WHY GUNS BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE (2006); James Lindgren &
Justin L. Heather, Counting Guns in Early America, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1777 (2002); James
Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195
(2002). There were non-fraudulent dissents from the Standard Model, although they had great
difficulty in explaining a coherent theory of what the Second Amendment does mean. See, e.g., H.
RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT To ARMS, OR, How THE
SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002); DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003);
Nelson Lund, Putting the Second Amendment to Sleep, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 101 (2004) (critical review
of the Uviller & Merkel and Williams books).
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vice.3 And the right is not limited to a single purpose (militia service),
but encompasses a wide variety of lawful purposes, particularly self-
defense.4 What effect does Heller have on three decades of Tenth Circuit
jurisprudence that was premised on an incorrect theory of the Second
Amendment?
In regards to Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit
will have to start all over again. It is difficult to argue for the continuing
validity of cases which are founded on the incorrect premise that the
Second Amendment protects only a tiny slice of the American people.
This Article surveys the Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence on the
Second Amendment chronologically. Although most of the pre-Heller
Tenth Circuit decisions are no longer valid, many of the new cases will
come to the same ultimate result as did the Tenth Circuit's previous cas-
es. For every federal gun control law which was addressed by the Tenth
Circuit pre-Heller, this Article explains how a post-Heller analysis might
proceed.
In particular, the Tenth Circuit can follow Heller's dicta and decide
that convicted felons are not protected by the Second Amendment, and
neither are machine guns. Some other issues, including gun bans for
certain misdemeanants, were not addressed in Heller, and so the Tenth
Circuit will have to decide those issues anew. It might be hoped that the
Tenth Circuit will undertake a more serious treatment of these unre-
solved issues than have some of the post-Heller district courts, whose
analyses have often been glib and shallow.
Glib and shallow is also a fair description of many of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's pre-Heller cases on the Second Amendment. Some of those cases
amounted to barely more than a judicial ipse dixit, and those cases cer-
tainly did not inspire confidence that the Circuit had treated the constitu-
tional issues with appropriate seriousness and diligence. Pre-Heller, the
Tenth Circuit's rule for the Second Amendment was "the government
always wins."5
Perhaps one reason is that almost all the persons raising Second
Amendment claims were highly unsympathetic. This was to be ex-
pected: once the Tenth Circuit nullified the Second Amendment in 1977,
just about the only people who would dare to raise a Second Amendment
claim were lawyers offering desperate arguments for criminal defen-
dants, or pro se citizens raising hopeless, poorly-prepared claims.
3. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.
4. Id. at 2801.
5. Cf United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(observing that the Warren Court's only consistent rule in merger cases was that "the government
always wins.").
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After a quarter-century of poor jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit did
improve significantly following the 2004 publication of a concurring
opinion by Judge Kelly in the Parker case. Once Judge Kelly had
pointed out many of the flaws in the Tenth Circuit's previous cases in-
volving the Second Amendment, most of the Tenth Circuit panels fol-
lowed Judge Kelly's admonition to decide cases narrowly, and to eschew
grand pronouncements asserting that ordinary people have no Second
Amendment rights.
I. MIGHTY OAKES FROM TINY THINKING GREW
The root of the Tenth Circuit's Second Amendment failure was the
1977 decision in United States v. Oakes.6 The case grew out of a prose-
cution by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF).7 An
undercover BATF agent met with Ted Oakes over a period of months.
The agent bought from him a non-functioning firearm which, with some
repair work by a gunsmith, could have been restored to function as a
machine gun. Arguably, the non-functioning gun was therefore a "ma-
chine gun" under federal law.8 Since the National Firearms Act of 1934,
federal law has required that machine gun owners register their guns and
pay a federal tax.9 Oakes had not done so, and after he was convicted at
trial in Kansas, he appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit.
The panel, consisting of Chief Judge Lewis, along with Judges Brei-
tenstein and Doyle, rejected Oakes' arguments about Fourth Amendment
violations and entrapment. As for Oakes' Second Amendment claim:
The second constitutional argument that appellant advances is that
the prosecution here violated his right to bear arms guaranteed by the
second amendment. Defendant presents a long historical analysis of
the amendment's background and purpose from which he concludes
that every citizen has the absolute right to keep arms. This broad
conclusion has long been rejected. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206.10
So instead of addressing Oakes' "long historical analysis of the
amendment's background," the panel simply cited the Supreme Court's
Miller case. It is true that Miller unquestionably stands for the proposi-
tion that the right to arms is not "absolute." The case reversed and re-
manded a district court decision dismissing charges against a career
6. See United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978).
7. In 2003, the Bureau was renamed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo-
sives (BATFE). Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 1111, 6 U.S.C.A. § 531 (2009).
8. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5845(b) (West 2009) ("The term 'machinegun' means any weapon which
shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot,
without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.").
9. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5861(d) (West 2009).
10. Oakes, 564 F.2d at 387 (footnote omitted).
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criminal who possessed an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation
of the National Firearms Act of 1934.'1 Presumably, if the right to arms
were "absolute," the Court would have followed the district court, and
held the National Firearms Act's registration requirement facially un-
constitutional. 
12
Of course most other constitutional rights are not "absolute" either.
If a party submitted a long historical brief which asserted that the right of
freedom of speech is absolute, a Circuit Court of Appeals could not dis-
pose of the First Amendment issue simply by citing a Supreme Court
precedent showing that the right of free speech is not absolute. The Cir-
cuit Court should take the further step of examining whether the litigant
has rights which are protected by the non-absolute First Amendment.
Before Heller, there were three different readings of Miller in the
Circuit Courts.
* That Miller stands for the proposition that the Second Amend-
ment is a "collective right." In effect, this made the right to arms
like "collective property" in a Communist country: nominally the
right belongs to all the people but in a non-individual way. In
practice, the right belongs only to the government. All nine Jus-
tices in Heller rejected the "collective right."'
13
* The right belongs to all American citizens (with a few excep-
tions, such as convicted felons), and the right may be exercised
by individuals for legitimate purposes, including self-defense.
This was the view of the Heller majority opinion written by Jus-
tice Scalia.
14
" The right belongs only to individuals who are serving in a state
militia. This was the view of the Heller dissent written by Jus-
tice Stevens.
1 5
The majority and dissenting opinions in Heller both argued at
length that their interpretation was supported by the Miller precedent. I
do not wish, in this Article, to argue for or against the conflicting inter-
11. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 174 (1939).
12. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939).
13. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008). See also id at 2822
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment
protects a 'collective right' or an 'individual right.' Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by
individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell
us anything about the scope of that right.").
14. Id. at 2797 ("Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.").
15. Id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Second Amendment "protects the
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's
power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons").
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pretations of Miller. I do not criticize the Tenth Circuit for adopting an
interpretation which, ultimately, had enough plausibility to earn the sup-
port of four Supreme Court Justices. However, as the back and forth
argument in Heller demonstrated, Miller is an ambiguous case, from
which different readers may in good faith draw different conclusions.
What is not legitimate was for the Tenth Circuit to blandly cite Miller-
with no discussion-as if Miller obviously had only one possible read-
ing.
The Tenth Circuit was not the only Circuit Court in the last quarter
of the twentieth century to pretend that Miller was much clearer than it
really is. In Can the Simple Cite be Trusted?, Brannon Denning details
how several Circuits used a simple cite to mask a much more compli-
cated precedent.' 6 Not until twenty-three years after Oakes, in United
States v. Baer, did the Tenth Circuit even attempt a serious analysis of
what the Miller precedent really meant.
Beyond the bare citation of Miller, Oakes provided a two-sentence
summary of the case:
The purpose of the second amendment as stated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Miller, supra at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, was to
preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state mi-
litia. The Court stated that the amendment must be interpreted and
applied with that purpose in view. Id
The above language is a fair paraphrase of part of the Miller opinion-
although that part of the opinion does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that only militiamen have Second Amendment rights. Justices Sca-
lia and Stevens argued extensively about whether Miller's statement
about the state militia purpose necessarily implies a right only for militia-
men.
Even if one assumes, from Miller, that the militia purpose of the
Second Amendment is the only purpose for which the right to arms ex-
ists, the assumption does not negate an individual right for all Ameri-
cans. The Heller decision quoted the leading American constitutional
law scholar of the latter nineteenth century, Michigan Supreme Court
Judge Thomas Cooley, to explain the point:
"It might be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the
right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but
this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent. The mili-
tia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons who,
under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are
officered and enrolled for service when called upon. But the law
16. Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of
United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 961 (1996).
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may make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform
military duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to
make any provision at all; and if the right were limited to those
enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by
the action or neglect to act of the government it was meant to hold in
check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people,
from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and
bear arms; and they need no permission or regulation of law for the
purpose. But this enables government to have a well-regulated mili-
tia; for to bear arms implies something more than the mere keeping;
it implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that makes
those who keep them ready for their efficient use; in other words, it
implies the right to meet for voluntary discipline in arms, observing
in doing so the laws of public order."'
7
Of course Oakes did precisely what Cooley had explained was wrong,
adopting an interpretation that made the Second Amendment a practical
nullity. Justice Scalia would later observe that lower court judges who
wrote opinions similar to Oakes had "overread Miller."' 8 He also ob-
served that "it should not be thought that the cases decided by these
judges would necessarily have come out differently under a proper inter-
pretation of the right."' 9 As we shall see, this is true for almost all of the
Tenth Circuit's Second Amendment cases.
With a militia-only reading of Miller, the Tenth Circuit created
another problem for itself: Oakes actually was a militiaman:
He contends that, even if the second amendment is construed to guar-
antee the right to bear arms only to an organized militia, he comes
within the scope of the amendment. He points out that under Kans.
Const. art. VIII, § 1, the state militia includes all "able-bodied male
citizens between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five years ......
He further points out that he is a member of "Posse Comitatus, a mi-
litia-type organization registered with the state of Kansas."
'20
The Tenth Circuit responded:
To apply the amendment so as to guarantee appellant's right to keep
an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to have any con-
17. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2811-12 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 271 (1880)). As the Heller Court
noted, the heading for the above-quoted section of the Cooley treatise was "The Right is General."
Id. at 2811.
18. Id. at 2815 n.24.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977). "Posse comitatus" is a legal
term referring to the authority of a sheriff to call forth the able-bodied men of his county in order to
assist him in the performance of his duties. For example, in 1977 the Pitkin County, Colorado,
sheriff used his posse comitatus power to summon armed citizens to assist in the manhunt for serial
killer Ted Bundy. Oakes apparently belonged to an organization of which named itself after a gov-
ernment power which it admired-as if a coin-collecting club named itself, "The Power to coin
Money and regulate the Value thereof."
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nection to the militia, merely because he is technically a member of
the Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or
policy.
21
Here, the court might have been expected to supply some logical analysis
and policy arguments. But the court did not. It is not very persuasive for
a court to announce a result based on "logic" and "policy"-and then fail
to offer any logic or policy.
Similarly, as to Oakes' membership in the non-government organi-
zation, the court simply declared-with not a shred of reasoning-that
the "lack of justification" for invoking the Second Amendment was "ap-
parent., 22  Yet whatever was so "apparent" to the panel was something
which the panel was unable or unwilling to articulate.
I am not claiming that it would have been impossible for the Tenth
Circuit to offer plausible logical or policy arguments, or to provide at
least a scintilla of support for the legal conclusion which was supposedly
so "apparent., 23 Or the panel could have said whatever else it was that
made the legal conclusion so "apparent" to the panel. However, Chief
Judge Lewis and the other judges did not deign to use any words to ex-
plain why they felt the way they did.
Judicial legitimacy depends on courts providing legal reasoning for
their decisions. A Circuit Court of Appeals decision-especially on an
issue of constitutional law-which does not even attempt to justify its
result is not really an application of the law, but is rather a form of judi-
cial lawlessness.
Parties making legal claims to the Tenth Circuit are expected to
provide arguments and citations in support of their claims.24 The Tenth
21. Id.
22. Id. ("This lack of justification is even more apparent when applied to appellant's member-
ship in 'Posse Comitatus,' an apparently nongovernmental organization. We conclude, therefore,
that this prosecution did not violate the second amendment.").
23. It appears that the group to which Oakes belonged was a highly disreputable organization,
if it was an affiliate of the "posse comitatus" groups which were active in several states during the
1970s. These groups were not organized around the principle of helping the local sheriff (which is
what a real posse comitatus does); rather, the groups were based on white racism. See ELAINE
LANDAU, THE WHITE POWER MOVEMENT: AMERICA'S RACIST HATE GROUPS 62 (1993). This is
perhaps why Oakes was targeted for a BATF undercover sting. A well-reasoned opinion from the
Tenth Circuit (or from the district court, after further fact-finding on remand) might have discussed
the so-called "posse comitatus" group, and explained that it is not a constitutional militia, in that it is
not organized for the purpose of aiding state or local law enforcement. The opinion might have
pointed out the absence of any evidence that the group had made itself available to come to the aid
of the local sheriff-such as by telling the sheriff of its existence, and providing contact information
in case the sheriff needed help.
24. See Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 15 F.3d 976, 977 (10th Cir. 1994) (An
"unsupported, conclusory assertion . . . is not adequate appellate argument."); Primas v. City of
Okla. City, 958 F.2d 1506, 1511 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[A party] has a duty to provide authority for any
argument that he raises."); Am. Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 415 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992) ("It
is insufficient merely to state in one's brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without
advancing reasoned argument as to the grounds for the appeal.").
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Circuit should have held itself to the same standard in the announcement
of its assertions of law. Instead, the reader is left with the strong suspi-
cion that the panel just did not like the idea that people might have a
right to own guns, and that the panel was unable to think of a legal rea-
son why, under a militia-only reading of Miller, a man who has been
statutorily declared by the Kansas state legislature to be a member of the
Kansas state militia has no Second Amendment right. Unable to provide
a legal argument, the panel resorted to bluster and ipse dixit.
Oakes had also argued that the Ninth Amendment protected his
ownership of firearms. This argument was not addressed on appeal,
since Oakes had not raised it below.25 The Ninth Amendment argument
for a right to own firearms has some heft: Nicholas Johnson has written a
Ninth Amendment argument for handguns (not for machine guns) which
provides extensive evidence that handgun ownership for self-defense
easily passes the various Supreme Court tests for unenumerated rights.26
However, the Tenth Circuit acted reasonably in not considering the issue,
since it was raised for the first time on appeal. In light of how irrespons-
ibly and lawlessly the Oakes panel treated the Second Amendment, it
was just as well that they never addressed the Ninth Amendment.
Following Heller, it would be easy for the Tenth Circuit to uphold
the National Firearms Act's registration requirement for machine guns.
The Heller majority wrote:
Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary mili-
tary equipment" could mean that only those weapons
useful in warfare are protected. That would be a star-
tling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the
National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns
(not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional,
machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939.... We
therefore read Miller to say only that the Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typical-
ly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,
such as short-barreled shotguns.
We also recognize another important limitation on the
right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have
explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those
"in common use at the time." . . . We think that limita-
tion is fairly supported by the historical tradition of pro-
hibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual wea-
pons."
25. Oakes, 564 F.2d at 387.
26. Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed
Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992).
[Vol. 86:3
2009] THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 909
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful
in military service-M-16 rifles and the like-may be
banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely
detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said,
the conception of the militia at the time of the Second
Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens
capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of
lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia
duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as ef-
fective as militias in the 18th century, would require so-
phisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at
large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small
arms could be useful against modem-day bombers and
tanks. But the fact that modem developments have li-
mited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and
the protected right cannot change our interpretation of
the right.
27
One can argue with the Heller language. As the opinion itself ad-
mits, all the precedents it cites merely involve restrictions on the "carry-
ing" of weapons, not their possession. But the opinion is what it is, and
if the opinion does not explicitly say that machine guns are not Second
Amendment arms, the opinion comes close enough so that lower federal
courts have readily cited it for the proposition that the Second Amend-
ment does not protect machine gun ownership.28
II. ROSE: SHORT RIFLES
The Tenth Circuit's next case on the Second Amendment, United
States v. Rose,29 will also require a new analysis under Heller's "danger-
ous and unusual" rule, once the issue returns to the Tenth Circuit.
27. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815-17 (2008) (citations omitted).
28. United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Machine guns are not in
common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of
dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use."); United States
v. Gilbert, 286 F. App'x 383 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a jury instruction that there is no Second
Amendment right to machine guns); Hamblen v. United States, No. 3:08-1034, slip op., 2008 WL
5136586, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2008) ("The Petitioner argues that the limitations placed on the
Second Amendment right to bear arms by the majority opinion in Heller can not square with the
Court's earlier decision in Miller. Whatever merit there is to that argument, however, this Court is
bound by the Helter opinion as written."); Mullenix v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154-D, slip op., 2008 WL 2620175, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008) ("Plain-
tiff is a federally-licensed firearms dealer, and alleges that the ATF arbitrarily denied him permission
to import a reproduction of a World War H-era German machinegun." The district court quoted the
Heller language to conclude that the Second Amendment does not apply to machine guns.).
29. 695 F.2d 1356 (1982). The panel consisted of Judges Holloway, Barrett, and Logan, with
the opinion written by Logan.
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At this point, it would be helpful to provide a brief explanation of
federal gun control law. The main federal gun control law is the much-
amended Gun Control Act of 1968.30 It covers the sale and possession of
ordinary rifles, shotguns, and handguns. We will examine it in more
detail infra, as it appears in Tenth Circuit cases.
A much older federal gun law is the National Firearms Act of 1934.
It requires registration and the payment of a tax for the possession (as
well as sale or manufacture) of a relatively small group of firearms: ma-
chine guns, short shotguns (barrels under eighteen inches), and short
rifles (barrels under sixteen inches). 31 These guns were controlled with
registration and taxing, rather than prohibition, because, as President
Franklin Roosevelt's Attorney General Homer Cummings explained to
the U.S. House Ways & Means Committee, the administration believed
that the Second Amendment forbade an outright federal ban of machine
guns. 32  (The NFA was expanded in 1968 to include some other wea-
pons, which will be discussed infra.)
It might be tempting for courts to assume that any firearm covered
by the National Firearms Act is a "dangerous and unusual" gun which,
pursuant to Heller, is not protected by the Second Amendment. But this
would obviously be going too far. Heller holds that handguns certainly
are protected by the Second Amendment;33 as introduced in Congress,
the draft NFA included handguns.34 The removal of handguns from the
NFA was the compromise which ended the National Rifle Association's
opposition to the NFA, so that the bill could pass.35 Had the NFA passed
in its original form, its inclusion of handguns obviously could not (post-
Heller) be used to assert that handguns are not covered by the Second
Amendment.
30. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-931 (West 2009).
31. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5801 (West 2009).
32. When a Representative asked the Attorney General how the proposed NFA "escaped" the
"provision in our Constitution denying the privilege to the legislature to take away the right to carry
arms," Cummings answered:
Oh, we do not attempt to escape it. We are dealing with another power, namely the pow-
er of taxation and of regulation under the interstate commerce clause. You see, if we
made a statute absolutely forbidding any human being to have a machine gun, you might
say there is some constitutional question involved. But when you say "We will tax the
machine gun" and when you say that "the absence of a license showing payment of the
tax has been made indicates that a crime has been perpetrated" you are easily within the
law.
The Representative then stated, "In other words, it does not amount to prohibition but allows of
regulation," to which Attorney General Cummings responded, "That is the idea. We have studied
that very carefully." The National Firearms Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 6, 13, 19 (1934).
33. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008).
34. The National Firearms Act of 1934, supra note 32, at 1.
35. To Regulate Commerce in Firearms: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1934).
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Moreover, Attorney General Cummings' own testimony indicates
that the administration believed that NFA firearms were covered by the
Second Amendment.36  His brief answer did not, however, specifically
indicate whether he thought all the NFA firearms were protected by the
Second Amendment, or whether only machine guns were.
As of 1934, machine guns, particularly the Thompson submachine
gun,37 were notorious as gangster weapons. Sawed-off shotguns were
(and still are) used by criminals with devastating effect. With a short-
ened barrel (say, eleven inches) they are as concealable as a very large
handgun, but are vastly more lethal at short range.
Short-barreled rifles, though, are another story. They are not and
never have been a particular criminal problem, and they were not in the
NFA as it was introduced in Congress. They were simply added into
NFA in order to clarify that longer rifles were not covered by some ge-
neric language in the draft NFA. 38 Pre-NFA, short rifles, typically with a
barrel length of fourteen or fifteen inches, were commonly used by hunt-
ers, trappers, ranchers, and horseback riders. Their shorter length meant
less weight, so they were particularly suitable for introducing young
people to firearms safety.39
So whether short rifles are within the scope of the Second Amend-
ment remains an open question, and the fact that they are covered by the
NFA does not, in itself, provide a negative answer. If short rifles are
within the Second Amendment, are the stringent NFA controls (which
36. The National Firearms Act of 1934, supra note 32, at 19.
37. A submachine gun is a smaller, more portable type of machine gun.
38. As introduced, the NFA bill provided that "the term 'firearm' means a pistol, revolver,
shotgun having a barrel less than sixteen inches in length, or any other firearm capable of being
concealed on the person, a muffler or silencer therefor, or a machine gun." The National Firearms
Act of 1934, supra note 32, at 1. Attorney General Cummings suggested changing the shotgun
barrel length to eighteen or twenty inches. Id. at 6. Because the draft NFA applied to "any other
firearm capable of being concealed on the person," there was concern that rifles might be inadver-
tently covered. After all, a tall person with a full-length coat can carry a large rifle concealed. So a
specific definition for short-barreled rifles was added to the NFA to prevent longer-barreled rifles
from being considered as a firearm capable of being concealed on the person. The following discus-
sion took place between Rep. Harold Knutson (a Republican from St. Cloud, Minnesota, who served
fifteen terms in the House) and Attorney General Cummings:
Mr. Knutson. General would there be any objection, on page 1, line 4, after the word
"shotgun" to add the words "or rifle" having a barrel less than 18 inches? The reason I
ask is I happen to come from a section of the State where deer hunting is a very popular
pastime in the fall of the year and, of course, I would not like to pass any legislation to
forbid or make it impossible for our people to keep arms that would permit them to hunt
deer.
Attorney General Cummings. Well, as long as it is not mentioned at all, it would not in-
terfere at all.
Mr. Knutson. It seems to me that an 18-inch barrel would make this provision stronger
than 16 inches, knowing what I do about firearms.
Attorney General Cummings. Well, there is no objection as far as we are concerned to
including rifles after the word "shotguns" if you desire.
Id. at 13. As enacted, the NFA covered rifles under eighteen inches. The length was changed to
sixteen inches in 1960.
39. E.g., JAMES J. GRANT, BOYS' SINGLE SHOT RIFLES, at vii, ix (1967).
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are much more restrictive than the controls for ordinary guns) a violation
of the Second Amendment? Mr. Heller's brief asserted that the NFA
would be unconstitutional for ordinary firearms such as handguns, but
did not address the question of short rifles.4 °
Rose involved a challenge to the conviction of a man who had
shortened the barrels on two rifles, without first obtaining the requisite
permission via the registration and tax scheme.41
Rose raised a variety of technical objections, which the court re-
jected, and which did not directly implicate the Second Amendment.
42
Rose's Second Amendment claim was dismissed with a simple citation
to Oakes, with no discussion.43
Post-Heller, this part of the Rose opinion is obviously not good law.
So far, the only post-Heller case involving short rifles is an unpublished
40. Brief of Respondent at 53, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-
290), available at 2008 WL 336304.
41. United States v. Rose, 695 F.2d 1356, 1357 (1982).
42. Id. For example, the guns had a folding, collapsible stock. This means that they could be
fired from the shoulder (with the stock extended), like a rifle. Or with the stock collapsed, the guns
could be fired one-handed, like a handgun. Rose argued that the guns were therefore not "rifles"
within the meaning of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(c) (2008). Notwithstanding the
rule of lenity, the court ruled that the guns were NFA rifles, especially since, as part of the process
authorizing their importation into the United States, they had been legally classified as "carbines."
Rose, 695 F.2d at 1357. (A carbine is type of lightweight rifle, with a barrel which is shorter [but not
necessarily shorter than sixteen inches] than the barrels of heavier rifles.). Rose also claimed that he
did not know it was illegal to shorten the barrels without going through the NFA tax and registration
process. As the court pointed out, "[t]he carton, the instructions, and the firearm itself contained
warnings that modification of the firearm was unlawful." Id. at 1358.
The National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record office is where records of NFA
registrations are kept. The office is operated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (BATFE). The records are incomplete and frequently inaccurate, and an internal BATFE
training admitted, in essence, that BATFE agents routinely perjure themselves by testifying that the
records are one hundred percent complete and accurate. See 142 CONG. REc. E1461-01 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Funderburk) ("Our first and main responsibility is to make accurate entries and to
maintain accuracy of the NFRTR .... [W]hen we testify in court, we testify that the data base is
100 percent accurate. That's what we testify to, and we will always testify to that. As you probably
well know, that may not be 100 percent true .... So the information on the 728,000 weapons that
are in the data base has to be 100 percent accurate. Like I told you before, we testify in court and, of
course, our certifications testify to that, too, when we're not physically there to testify, that we are
100 percent accurate .... When I first came in a year ago, our error rate was between 49 and 50
percent .... ") (quoting Thomas A. Busey, then Chief of the National Firearms Act Branch of the
BATF, in the October 18, 1995 training video). The trial court had denied Rose's motion to inspect
the records room. The Tenth Circuit found the denial proper: "Rose did not allege that he had in
fact registered the weapons, even after his counsel was specifically questioned on this point by the
trial judge at the hearing on the motion. He did not allege that the system had malfunctioned as to
him. There may be circumstances in which one who wishes to impeach the quality of a recordkeep-
ing system must be allowed to examine the system's operation." Rose, 695 F.2d at 1358. As the
Rose court recognized, inspection of records room might well be appropriate in a future case. For a
defendant who credibly claims that he did register a NFA firearm, it is questionable whether, as a
matter of law, the absence of registration records in the BATFE records room would be sufficient to
support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt-especially given BATFE's own admission that the
records are incomplete and given that BATFE agents routinely commit pejury about the records.
43. Id. at 1359.
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Ninth Circuit decision which assumes, with no reasoning, that Heller's
language about machine guns also applies to short rifles.44
HI. SLESARIK: THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION
Slesarik's friend was arrested for carrying a revolver in a New Mex-
ico restaurant, in violation of a city ordinance which forbade all gun car-
rying.45 Slesarik, who was present in the restaurant (according to the
trial court's finding of disputed facts), was later arrested as an accessory.
In a pro se case under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, Slesarik sued
the arresting officer, the police chief, two judges, and the City of Deming
for violating his rights under the Second Amendment and under the New
Mexico Constitution. At trial, some of the counts were dismissed on
grounds of immunity: the jury ruled for Slesarik on some other counts,
but awarded him no money damages. 46 The Tenth Circuit affirmed all
aspects of the result below.47
Slesarik had allegedly carried his own gun to the police station
where his friend was being booked. Although he was not prosecuted for
the carrying at the police station, Heller would allow a prosecution in
such a situation. Heller preemptively affirms the constitutionality of
"laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings .... ,48
44. United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App'x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Under Heller, individu-
als still do not have the right to possess machineguns or short-barreled rifles .... ").
45. Slesarik v. Luna County, No. 93-2161, 1993 WL 513843, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993)
(per curiam) (Seymour, Anderson, and Ebel, JJ.) (referring to ordinance 6-4-6 of the City of Dem-
ing). The trial court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional under the New Mexico Constitution's right
to arms. Id. at *2 (citing Mem. Opinion & Order at 9, Slesarik v. Luna County, R. Vol. 3, Tab 66
(quoting City of Las Vegas v. Mosberg, 485 P.2d 737, 738 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971))). The New Mex-
ico constitutional right explicitly excludes concealed weapons. N.M. CONsT. art. IL § 6 ("No law
shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunt-
ing and recreational use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the
carrying of concealed weapons."). The arresting officer claimed that Slesarik's friend's handgun
was "partially concealed." Slesarik, 1993 WL 513843, at *1. There is a large body of state law,
much of it contradictory, about whether partially-concealed handguns are considered "concealed" or
not. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-1(1) (2008) (banning the carrying of a firearm, except with
a license, which is "concealed in whole or in part"); State v. Fluker, 311 So. 2d 863, 866 (La. 1975)
(holding that a weapon which is sufficiently exposed so as to reveal its identity is not concealed,
even if it is not in full open view); Reid v. Commonwealth, 184 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Ky. 1944) (find-
ing that a pistol stuck in a belt was not concealed); Winston v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 141, 146
(Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("We have previously stated that a weapon is hidden from common view under
[Virginia] Code § 18.2-308(A) when it is 'hidden from all except those with an unusual or excep-
tional opportunity to view it."'); State v. Ogletree, 244 So. 2d 288, 291 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (deter-
mining that a partially visible gun in waistband is not "concealed"); W. M. Moldoff, Annotation,
Offense of Carrying Concealed Weapon as Affected by Manner of Carrying or Place of Conceal-
ment, 43 A.L.R.2d 492, § 5 (1955). The trial court ruled that the issue of whether the friend's hand-
gun was "concealed" was a jury question. Slesarik, 1993 WL 513843, at *2. Many other courts
have adopted a similar approach.
46. Slesarik, 1993 WL 513843, at *2.
47. Id. at *4.
48. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008). Post-Heller, the "sensitive
places" rule has been used to uphold bans on carrying a concealed handgun on an airplane (an easy
case) as well as possessing a gun in a parked car in a Post Office parking lot (a harder case). See
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IV. BRUMFIELD: UNREGISTERED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOR USE IN CRIME
In 1968, the National Firearms Act was amended so that it also cov-
ered certain explosive devices. 49 Brumfield was convicted of possession
of nine unregistered explosive devices.50 He had become the subject of
an undercover BATF investigation after Roosevelt City, Utah, police told
BATF that Brumfield had made comments about killing people with
explosives, about blowing up the statue of the Angel Moroni (which
adorns the Latter Day Saint temple in Salt Lake City), and had boasted
about his expertise with explosives. 5'
BATF deployed an undercover informant, who (the trial court
found) got Brumfield to supply him with car bombs, which Brumfield
was told were being re-sold to California gangs. 52  "The undercover
agents then asked Mr. Brumfield to make silencers for Uzi submachine
guns in an attempt to divert Mr. Brumfield's activities toward less dan-
gerous activities. 53
At trial, Brumfield claimed that he was entrapped, and the trial
judge allowed the jury to consider the issue. The jury found that he was
not entrapped. 54
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected Brumfield's entrapment ar-
gument.55 Brumfield also raised the Second Amendment, which the Cir-
cuit brusquely dismissed with a citation to Oakes and Rose (which the
opinion misspelled as "Ross"). Notably, the decision simply said that
Brumfield's Second Amendment claims were "without merit." The pan-
United States v. Davis, No. 05-50726, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 26934, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Sept. 10,
2008) (unpublished and unsigned decision) (finding 49 U.S.C. § 46505, which bans concealed wea-
pons on airplanes, constitutional); United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, slip op., 2008 WL
2622996, at *6 (E.D. La. June 30, 2008) (upholding the ban on postal parking lots as narrowly
tailored to effect public and workplace safety solely on postal property, so 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(a) is
not unconstitutional as applied). The Dorosan opinion assumes, without evidence, that the parking
lot ban does in fact advance public safety. The court's observation that the ban at issue does not
affect the right of all individuals to bear arms at home or traveling in a vehicle to and from work
through high crime areas, is presumably based on the fact that Dorosan could have parked his private
car on a public street or a private lot near the post office; if no such parking were available, then
Dorosan would have been deprived of his right to protect himself while traveling to and from work,
and the parking lot ban might have been unconstitutional "as applied." Id.
49. See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5845(f), 5861(d), 5871 (West 2009). "'[Destructive device' means
(1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (A) bomb, (B) grenade, (C) rocket having a propellant
charge of more than four ounces, (D) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than
one-quarter ounce, (E) mine, or (F) similar device. ." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(n. So the NFA does not
regulate an "explosive" per se, but rather regulates devices (bombs, grenades, etc.) which use explo-
sives. Explosives qua explosives are regulated by a separate law. 18 U.S.C.A. § 847 (West 2009).
50. United States v. Brumfield, No. 93-4033, 1994 WL 475030, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 1,
1994) (unpublished disposition) (per curiam).
51. Id.
52. Id. at *2.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *1.
55. /d. at *2.
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el did not opine that the reason Brumfield's claims were meritless was
that he was not in a state militia.56
Because Brumfield's involvement with weapons was for the pur-
pose of what he believed to be serving as an accessory to criminal homi-
cides, he clearly did not have a meritorious Second Amendment claim.
Just as the First Amendment protects speech in general, but does not
protect speech that is part of a violent crime (e.g., two criminals making
plans for a homicide), the Second Amendment does not protect the sup-
plying of firearms (or explosive devices) for use in violent crimes.
In practice, the BATFE (formerly the BATF)57 administers the Na-
tional Firearms Act so that a person can lawfully possess machine guns,
but the BATFE is much more restrictive about allowing registration for
explosive devices. It is doubtful that BATFE would accept a registration
for a person to manufacture car bombs, even if the person could prove
beyond any doubt that his purposes were innocent. (E.g., he wanted to
blow up some old cars on his farm.)
Heller never addressed the issue of explosive devices, but, given the
sensibility of the Court's language on machine guns, it seems very doubt-
ful that most explosive devices would be considered to have Second
Amendment protection. (Gunpowder, which is an "explosive" but not an
"explosive device," would obviously be included in the Second Amend-
ment.)
Even without Heller, it might be argued that explosive devices are
not Second Amendment "arms," since Second Amendment arms are
those that can be aimed at a particular target, whereas explosive devices
kill everyone in the area.
A closer question is raised by sound reducers, which are sometimes
inaccurately called "silencers." These too are covered by the NFA, with
possession allowed if there is registration and the tax is paid.58 Brum-
field was not convicted of making unregistered silencers, although the
BATFE's confidential informant had tried to convince him to do so.
59
What about a situation where a silencer was not manufactured for
use in a violent crime? Sound reducers have many legitimate purposes.
Except in the movies, sound reducers do not really make a gun silent (so
56. Id. at *4.
57. See Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2274 (2002) (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C.A. § 531 (West 2009)).
58. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-5802, 5841 (West 2009) (procedure for lawful registration and
payment of tax); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(24) (West 2009) (defining "silencers"); 26 U.S.C.A. §
5845(a)(7) (West 2009).
59. Brumfield, 1994 WL 475030, at *2.
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that an assassin may carry out his crime undetected). 6° Rather, sound
reducers simply reduce a gun's noise by a several decibels. Because a
gunshot is very loud, the reduced sound is still quite loud.
The most obvious legitimate use of a sound reducer is reducing
noise so that it does not bother neighbors. For example, a person with an
acre or more of property might have a shooting range, and might use
sound reducers to reduce the noise that his neighbors hear.
Sound reducers are also a very useful tool in firearms training. The
noise from a gun may produce an involuntary flinch in some novice
shooters. If the novice trains with a gun that has a sound reducer, the
tendency to acquire the bad habit of flinching will be reduced, and the
novice will learn to shoot more accurately and more safely. In addition,
the noise reduction makes it easier for students to hear instructions from
the safety instructor.
For all of the above reasons, most European countries regulate
sound reducers much less stringently than does the U.S. federal govern-
ment. Although European gun controls are generally more restrictive
than American ones, European countries do not put sound reducers in a
specially restrictive category reserved for very powerful weapons like
machine guns and explosive devices.
In practice, the BATFE does allow the registration of silencers un-
der the NFA. However, the $200 tax and the burden of the months-long
registration process makes the use and possession of sound reducers in
the United States much rarer than it would otherwise be.
Heller allows bans on "dangerous and unusual" weapons. But a
sound reducer is not even a weapon, and it is "dangerous" only in the
eyes of ignorant people whose knowledge of firearms is based mainly on
James Bond and similar movies.
The NFA may be constitutional as applied to machine guns, but it is
debatable whether extremely stringent NFA rules are really constitutional
for benign accessories such as sound reducers. Arguably, a sound reduc-
er might constitutionally be regulated the same as an ordinary firearm
under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (requiring a background check before
purchase, and simple on-the-spot registration, but not a high tax).
V. GUEST: ExTRA PUNISHMENT FOR EXERCISING CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
Another unpublished case was United States v. Guest.61 Under the
federal sentencing guidelines, the district court had used its discretion to
60. See generally 1 ALAN C. PAULSON, SILENCER: HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE; SPORTING
AND TACrICAL SILENCERS (1996); 2 ALAN C. PAULSON, N.R. PARKER & PETER G. KOKALIS,
SILENCER: HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE; CQB, ASSAULT RIFLE, AND SNIPER TECHNOLOGY (2002).
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enhance Guest's sentence because firearms were found at his residence,
even though the firearms had nothing to do with the crime which he
committed. He did not preserve the issue for appeal, and the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided that his raising of a Second Amendment argument on appeal
did not meet the standards for a post-conviction collateral attack under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.62
The grounds for a 2255 motion include "that the sentence was im-
posed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Al-
though the Guest court provided no citation, presumably the court was
relying on Oakes for the theory that since Guest was not in the National
Guard, he had no Second Amendment rights.
But now, a post-conviction 2255 claim about the Second Amend-
ment from an ordinary citizen would raise a real constitutional issue.
And a claim that the defendant was punished for possessing firearms,
even though the firearms had no relation to the underlying offense,
would be meritorious.
To see why, let us examine a First Amendment analogy. The U.S.
Constitution protects only two specifically-identified technologies:
"arms" and "the press," and the Founders plainly described the two as
63
technologies of supreme importance in the preservation of a free state.
61. U.S. v. Guest, No. 94-6091, 1994 WL 602693 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1994) (per curiam).
62. Id. at *2. Guest was running a large marijuana growing and distribution operation out of
his home. It is possible that the guns were in fact used to support the crime, in that the guns might
have been kept to protect the operation. However, the Tenth Circuit opinion does not indicate that
there was any such factual finding by the lower court.
63. See Edward Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies: How the Right to Bear Arms Affects
Copyright Regulations of Speech Technologies, WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming May 2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 156526.
The principal (initial) drafter of both clauses, James Madison, often spoke of arms and
the press in the same breath. For example, in his notes for his floor speech on June 8,
1789 in favor of the Bill of Rights, Madison grouped together as features or flaws of the
English Declaration of Rights of 1688: "no freedom of press" as well as "arms to Pro-
testts" only .... And writing years later, Madison spoke of both rights as vital to the Re-
public: "a government resting on a minority is an aristocracy, not a Republic, and could
not be safe with a numerical and physical force against it, without a standing army, and
enslaved press, and a disarmed populace."
Madison was not alone in drawing a connection between arms and press in the Framing
generation. As Randy Barnett and Don Kates have recounted, "James Madison, James
Monroe, Fisher Ames, Albert Gallatin, and others mentioned the right to arms in the
same breath with the freedom of religion and press, and described them all interchangea-
bly as 'human rights,' 'private rights,' 'essential and sacred rights' which 'each individu-
al reserves to himself."'
To the modem sensibilities, the historical connection between arms and the press may
seem odd. But, to the Framing generation, the connection would have been commonsen-
sical. The right to bear arms and the freedom of the press presented the exact same type
of question for the Framers: can there ever be a natural right to a man-made device? In
the case of arms and presses, the Framers believed so.
Id. at *10-11.
It is also significant that five of the eight states that proposed amendments during the rati-
fication of the Constitution offered proposals for protecting the freedom of the press...
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Just as someone can be punished for using arms in a crime, he can be
punished for using a press in a crime.
Imagine someone who owns an at-home printing press. He creates
a fake charity, designed to swindle Roman Catholics. Then, using his at-
home press, he prints counterfeit copies of the Denver Catholic Register,
the newspaper which is mailed to Catholic families through the Archdi-
ocese of Denver. The counterfeit copy is identical in every respect to the
real current issue of the Denver Catholic Register-except that Archbi-
shop Chaput's real column is replaced by a fake column in which the
Archbishop purportedly implores all Catholics to donate generously to
the fake charity.
Having previously stolen the Archdiocese's mailing list, the crimi-
nal sneaks into a post office, and substitutes the counterfeit issues of the
Denver Catholic Register for the real one. The U.S. Postal Service de-
livers the fake issues to Denver-area Catholics.
Later, the criminal is caught and convicted of mail fraud. Can his
possession of the printing press be used to enhance his sentence under
the Sentencing Guidelines? Certainly yes. The printing press is evi-
dence of the criminal's use of a special skill, and therefore can justify
extra points under the Sentencing Guidelines.
64
Now imagine another criminal, who also uses an at-home printing
press. He prints flyers which he hands out on the Pearl Street Mall in
Boulder, urging people to recycle. In the very same room in his house
where the printing press is kept, he also cultivates psychedelic mu-
shrooms, and sells them. He is eventually caught and convicted.
Can his sentence be enhanced because he possessed the printing
press? Of course not. The possession of the press is constitutionally
protected, and the man's possession of the press had nothing to do with
his crime.
Similar reasoning would apply to the possession of arms. If the
arms are actually used in the crime (e.g., an armed robbery, the guarding
of a crack house), then an enhanced sentence is constitutional. If the
arms have no relation to the crime, then there should not, constitutional-
ly, be any extra punishment for possessing them.
[and] the right to bear arms .... And of these states, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North
Carolina... placed the proposals for the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms
consecutively or back-to-back-which is how eventually they came to be ordered in the
Bill of Rights in what became of the First and Second Amendments. In their state consti-
tutions and declarations of rights, Massachusetts (1780), Pennsylvania (1776), and Ver-
mont (1777) also listed the protections for the freedom of the press and the right to bear
arms consecutively.
Id. at *13.
64. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.3 (2005) ("[D]efendant ... used a special
skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission... of the offense.").
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VI. MARCHANT: PRIVACY OF REGISTRATION FORMS
The first Tenth Circuit Second Amendment case involving the Gun
Control Act (ordinary guns) rather than the National Firearms Act (ma-
chine guns, etc.) came in 1995.65
Because of extensive documented abuses by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms (BATF),66 Congress in 1986 enacted the Firearms
65. United States v. Marchant, 55 F.3d 509 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
66. SLJBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., THE RIGHT
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 20-23 (2d. Sess. 1982), available at http://www.guncite.com/
joumals/senrpt/senrpt.html:
Based upon these hearings, it is apparent that enforcement tactics made possible by cur-
rent federal firearms laws are constitutionally, legally, and practically reprehensible. Al-
though Congress adopted the Gun Control Act with the primary object of limiting access
of felons and high-risk groups to firearms, the overbreadth of the law has led to neglect of
precisely this area of enforcement .... [S]ubsequent to these hearings, BATF stated that
55 percent of its gun law prosecutions overall involve persons with no record of a felony
conviction, and a third involve citizens with no prior police contact at all.
The Subcommittee received evidence that BATF has primarily devoted its firearms en-
forcement efforts to the apprehension, upon technical malum prohibitum charges, of in-
dividuals who lack all criminal intent and knowledge .... Even in cases where the col-
lectors secured acquittal, or grand juries failed to indict, or prosecutors refused to file
criminal charges, agents of the Bureau have generally confiscated the entire collection of
the potential defendant upon the ground that he intended to use it in that violation of the
law. In several cases, the agents have refused to return the collection even after acquittal
by jury.
... In several cases, the Bureau has sought conviction for supposed technical violations
based upon policies and interpretations of law which the Bureau had not published in the
Federal Register, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552 ....
The Constitution Subcommittee also received evidence that the Bureau has formulated a
requirement, of which dealers were not informed that requires a dealer to keep official
records of sales even from his private collection. BATF has gone farther than merely
failing to publish this requirement. At one point, even as it was prosecuting a dealer on
the charge (admitting that he had no criminal intent), the Director of the Bureau wrote
Senator S. . Hayakawa to indicate that there was no such legal requirement and it was
completely lawful for a dealer to sell from his collection without recording it .... In
these and similar areas, the Bureau has violated not only the dictates of common sense,
but of 5 U.S.C. § 552, which was intended to prevent "secret lawmaking" by administra-
tive bodies.
These practices, amply documented in hearings before this Subcommittee, leave little
doubt that the Bureau has disregarded rights guaranteed by the constitution and laws of
the United States.
It has trampled upon the second amendment by chilling exercise of the right to keep and
bear arms by law-abiding citizens.
It has offended the fourth amendment by unreasonably searching and seizing private
property.
It has ignored the Fifth Amendment by taking private property without just compensation
and by entrapping honest citizens without regard for their right to due process of law.
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Owners' Protection Act (FOPA).67 That Act strengthened federal laws
regarding use of guns in violent crimes and drug crimes, and also im-
posed various restrictions on BATF searches and seizures, forfeitures,
and prosecutions for technical paperwork violations.
Marchant pawned a rifle in New Mexico. To redeem a gun from a
pawnshop, the owner must go through the same process as if he were
buying a gun.68 Accordingly, when Marchant redeemed his gun, he
filled out Federal Form 4473. That form must be completed by all gun
buyers; on it, the buyer provides identifying information (such as name,
address, and date of birth), and checks boxes to indicate his eligibility to
buy a gun (that he is not a convicted felon, not under indictment, was
never dishonorably discharged from the military, etc.). The firearms
dealer fills in information about the make, model, and serial number of
the gun.69
After the sale is completed, the dealer must retain the 4473 form for
the next twenty years.70 In effect, the gun is registered, with the registra-
tion record held by the dealer. The system is part of the compromise that
allowed the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Many gun control
advocates had demanded a federally-centralized gun registration sys-
tem. 71 Congress rejected the idea, and instead enacted the de-centralized,
dealer-based system. The de-centralized system had the advantage of
creating records of gun sales, without the dangers (according to Second
Amendment advocates) of a centralized registry, which could be used for
gun confiscation. The Second World War was still fresh in the minds of
many congresspeople, and they were aware that the Nazis had used gun
registries created by the Weimar Republic and by other democratic na-
tions which were later conquered by the Nazis in order to carry out gun
confiscation.72
The day after Marchant redeemed his rifle from the pawn shop in
Albuquerque, two New Mexico Probation-Parole Officers visited the
pawn shop, because they had heard that someone on probation (not Mar-
chant) had bought a gun there. With the consent of the pawnshop owner,
... [E]xpert evidence was submitted establishing that approximately 75 percent of BATF
gun prosecutions were aimed at ordinary citizens who had neither criminal intent nor
knowledge, but were enticed by agents into unknowing technical violations....
67. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § l(a)-(b), 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-929 (West 2009)).
68. The requirement was imposed administratively by the BATF. 27 C.F.R. § 178.124(a)
(2002); see also Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 828-29 (1974) (upholding regulation).
69. 27 C.F.R. § 178.124 (2002).
70. 27 C.F.R. § 178.129(b) (2002).
71. See ROBERT SHERRILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 85-86 (1975).
72. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazi Firearms Law and the Disarming of the German
Jews, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 483, 485 (2000). Concern about Nazi firearms practices had led
Congress during World War I to specifically exempt firearms from the Property Requisition Act.
See Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal
Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597, 599 (1995).
920 [Vol. 86:3
2009] THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 921
they examined the store's 4473 forms. In the course of doing so, they
saw that Marchant had just redeemed his gun, and they knew that Mar-
chant had been convicted of a felony.
Marchant was then prosecuted and convicted for making a false
statement in acquiring a firearm, and of being a felon in possession of a
firearm.73 The appeal turned on the Fourth Amendment, and Marchant's
argument that his 4473 form should have been suppressed as the fruit of
an illegal search.
The 1968 GCA had allowed BATF limitless inspection of the 4473
forms retained by licensed firearms dealers.74 FOPA changed the law so
that once a year, BATF can conduct a compliance inspection to see if the
records are being properly maintained. The one-per-year-limit does not
apply if BATF has reason to believe that the particular dealer is not
maintaining records appropriately, or may be violating some other part of
federal gun law.75 In addition, BATF can inspect dealer records as often
as it wants to when it is tracing a gun. And BATF can conduct limitless
inspections in the course of bona fide criminal investigations. 76 In con-
junction with a firearms trace or a criminal investigation, BATF can
share information from the 4473 forms with federal, state, or local law
enforcement.77
Thus, Congress crafted a system to protect firearms dealers from
administrative harassment, to protect the privacy of firearms purchasers,
and to allow legitimate records inspections for law enforcement purpos-
es.
Accordingly, the state law enforcement officers' warrantless exami-
nation of the pawnshop records appears dubious. If the officers had a
legitimate law enforcement investigation (as they apparently did), they
should have asked BATF to take the lead in inspecting the records, and
to share the information with them. Because part of the purpose of the
GCA/FOPA records system is to protect the privacy of firearms purchas-
ers, it is not clear that the pawnshop owner had the authority to allow the
records examination, and he violated the privacy of his customers.
However, the Tenth Circuit evaded the Fourth Amendment issue by
holding that Marchant had no standing to raise privacy claims under
GCA/FOPA. Because Marchant was a convicted felon, he had no
73. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 922(a)(6), (g)(1) (West 2009).
74. See Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 923(g), 82 Stat. 1213, 1223 (1968) (requiring that licensed
dealer must "make such records available for inspection at all reasonable times").
75. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 449,454 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §
923(g)(l)(A) (West 2009)); Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 449, 454 (1986) (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 923(g)(1)(B) (West 2009)).
76. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 449, 454 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §
923(g)(1)(B) (West 2009)).
77. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(D), 100 Stat. 449,455 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §
923(g)(1)(D) (West 2009)).
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GCA/FOPA privacy rights.7 8 As the court detailed, the language of GCA
and FOPA and their legislative history was replete with statements of
Congress's objective of keeping guns away from criminals, including
convicted felons; Congress apparently cared about the privacy rights of
law-abiding citizens, but not of criminals.79
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion about standing, as applied to Mar-
chant, was not unreasonable. On the other hand, the privacy rights of the
rest of the pawnshop's customers were violated, and they were the law-
abiding gun owners whose privacy rights Congress had intended to pro-
tect. As a practical matter, they had no remedy for the violation of their
privacy, and under the Tenth Circuit's rule, there is no deterrent to viola-
tions of the privacy rights of the law-abiding gun owners whose 4473
forms are in the custody of licensed firearms dealers throughout the Cir-
cuit.
In Marchant, as in many other cases, the continuing erosion of the
exclusionary rule leads to an attractive result (the conviction of an actual
criminal) in the case at bar, but greatly harms the privacy rights of people
whom the court will never see.
Marchant had argued in that "Congress manifested an intent to
create a reasonable expectation of privacy in firearms records in the pos-
session of federally licensed firearms dealers in order to protect Second
Amendment freedoms., 80 Happily, the panel did not retort that only mi-
litiamen could have Second Amendment freedoms; rather the court did
not address the Second Amendment issue, since the admissibility of the
evidence was resolved by analysis of the standing issue.
As for the ban on the possession of firearms by convicted felons,
Heller explicitly affirmed the constitutionality of the ban (at least for
felons in general, without discussion of whether the ban might be un-
constitutional as applied in particular cases). 81 Lower federal courts have
readily upheld post-Heller challenges to the felon-in-possession law.82
78. United States v. Marchant, 55 F.3d 509, 514-16 (10th Cir. 1995).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 515.
81. "[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill .... District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).
82. United States v. Brunson, No. 07-4962, 2008 WL 4180057 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 2008)
(unpublished); United States v. Irish, No. 06-4082, 2008 WL 2917818 (8th Cir. July 31, 2008)
(unpublished); United States v. Gilbert, No. 07-30153, 2008 WL 2740453 (9th Cir. July 15, 2008)
(unpublished); United States v. Harden, No. 06-79-KI, 2007 WL 3312342 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2007)
(unpublished); United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008 WL 2937742 (E.D. Wis. July 23,
2008) (unpublished); Johnson v. United States, No. 4:06-CV-1363, 2008 WL 2397378 (E.D. Mo.
June 9, 2008); Industrious v. Cauley, No. 08-CV-109-HRW, 2008 WL 4525451, at *4 (E.D. Ky.
Oct. 1, 2008) (unpublished) (mistakenly treating the dissenting opinion in Parker v. District of Co-
lumbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), affd sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645
(2008), as if it had been the majority opinion).; United States v. Kilgore, No. 08-cr-66-bbc, 2008 WL
4058020 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 26, 2008) (unpublished).
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VII. WILKs: THE FEDERAL MACHINE GUN BAN
The passage of FOPA through Congress in 1985-86 had an odd
twist. The bill passed the Senate overwhelmingly. When the bill was
before the House, Speaker Tip O'Neil made Rep. Mario Biaggi the pre-
siding officer. Biaggi was a staunch gun control advocate, and would
later leave the House after being convicted of felonies.
A proposed amendment to the bill, by Rep. Bill Hughes of New Jer-
sey, banned the sale of machine guns manufactured after the date that
FOPA would become law. There was no debate, and Biaggi called for a
voice vote. Ignoring (in violation of House rules) members' demands for
a roll call, Biaggi declared that the amendment was adopted. So now, 18
U.S.C. 922(o) is part of the Gun Control Act, and bans citizens who are
not government employees from possessing machine guns manufactured
after May 19, 1986. 83 For machine guns manufactured before that date,
of which there are about 120,000, possession is still lawful, as long as the
tax and registration requirements of the National Firearms Act are met.
FOPA did not change the law regarding sound reducers (a/k/a "si-
lencers"), and they may still be possessed in compliance with the NFA.
Larry Francis Wilks owned a gun store in Tulsa. He sold three
post-1986 machine guns to undercover BATFE agents, as well as two
sound reducers for which he did not comply with the NFA transfer re-
quirements.84
On appeal, Wilks did not raise the Second Amendment. But the
court noted that "this orphan of the Bill of Rights may be something of a
brooding omnipresence here., 85 Wilks argued that the machine gun ban
was unconstitutional, because it was not a proper exercise of Congres-
sional power to regulate interstate commerce. A few months before the
Tenth Circuit heard Wilks, the Supreme Court had ruled in United States
v. Lopez that the federal "Gun Free School Zones Act" was not a lawful
exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.
86
83. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or
possess a machinegun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to-
(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United States or any
department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency or political subdivision
thereof; or
(3) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully possessed
before the date this subsection takes effect.
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West 2009).
84. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 1519 n.2 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.46 (5th Cir. 1993),
aff'd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
86. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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As the Tenth Circuit noted, there was no legislative history indicat-
ing that Congress was thinking about interstate commerce when the ma-
chine gun ban was passed. Or, indeed, that Congress was thinking about
anything at all:
The legislative history surrounding § 922(o) is virtually nonexistent.
The provision was a last minute floor amendment, no hearings were
conducted, and no committee report refers to it. See David T. Hardy,
The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Pers-
pective, 17 Cumb.L.Rev. 585, 670-71 (1987). The scant legislative
history merely contains a discussion of an earlier bill proposed in the
House of Representatives which "prohibited the transfer and posses-
sion of machine guns, used by racketeers and drug traffickers for in-
timidation, murder and protection of drugs and the proceeds of
crime." H.R.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1330. "The only apparent explanation
for it is the statement of its sponsor, Representative Hughes, that 'I
do not know why anyone would object to the banning of machine
guns."' . . . (quoting 132 Cong.Rec. H1750 (1986)) (statement of
Rep. Hughes)).
87
The Tenth Circuit applied the three-part test which the Supreme
Court had articulated in Lopez. Under the interstate commerce clause,
according to Lopez, Congress can regulate:
(1) the channels of interstate commerce;
(2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities"; and
(3) activities which have "a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce ... i e., those activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce.
, 88
The Wilks court decided that the machine gun ban was a proper example
of Congress's power to regulate "things in interstate commerce." First,
when enacting the Gun Control Act of 1968, which Congress amended in
1986 with FOPA, Congress had made findings about the need to regulate
interstate firearms transfers.89 Supposedly, these 1968 findings could
inure to the benefit of the 1986 machine gun ban-even though Congress
was not regulating machine gun transactions, but was instead simply
banning possession.
The Supreme Court had not allowed such relation back in Lopez,
but the Tenth Circuit distinguished the ban on possessing or carrying
87. Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1519.
88. Id. at 1520 (summarizing and quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
89. Id. at 1521-22.
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handguns within a thousand feet of a school. That activity was not a
commercial activity, either alone or even in the aggregate of all such
carrying. In contrast, machine guns "by their nature are 'a commodity..
transferred across state lines for profit by business entities."
'9°
This argument makes no sense. Handguns also, "by their nature are
a commodity... transferred across state lines for profit by business enti-
ties." Yet Congress could not ban the mere carrying of handguns in cer-
tain places. The machine gun law went even further, by banning posses-
sion entirely. A machine gun is no more and no less a commodity than is
a handgun. Yet according to the Tenth Circuit, a machine gun, just by
being a machine gun, has "interstate attributes":
Section 922(o) regulates "this extensive, intricate, and definitively
national market for machineguns" by prohibiting the transfer and
possession of machineguns manufactured after May 19, 1986. As
such, § 922(o) represents Congressional regulation of an item bound
up with interstate attributes and thus differs in substantial respect
from legislation concerning possession of a firearm within a purely
local school zone.
91
As if a thing can have interstateness in its very nature, based on how it
functions. A rocket capable of firing hundreds of miles might be consi-
dered "bound up with interstate attributes." The maximum range of a
machine gun (depending on whether it is a rifle or a handgun), is no
more than a few hundred yards. The capacity to shoot a projectile sever-
al hundred yards would only be "bound up with interstate attributes" if
the average size of a state were about a square mile or less.
Second, the ban on local possession was supposedly necessary, in
the congressional mind, to "regulate" (that is, prohibit) interstate sales.
Thus, although not explicitly stated in the language of the statute it-
self, it is evident that Congress prohibited the transfer and possession
of most post-1986 machineguns not merely to ban these firearms, but
90. Id. at 1521 (quoting United States v. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 249 (E.D. Mich. 1994). In
a footnote, the Wilks court wrote:
We are mindful that in Lopez the Supreme Court refused to examine previous Congres-
sional findings surrounding prior federal firearms legislation in determining whether §
922(q) violated the Commerce Clause because § 922(q) "represent[ed] a sharp break with
the long-standing pattern of federal firearms legislation." Lopez, 514 U.S. at __, 115 S.
Ct. at 1632. In contrast to § 922(q), we do not view § 922(o) as constituting a "sharp
break" with previous firearms legislation which regulated the interstate flow of firearms.
Rather, § 922(o) is consistent with this earlier federal legislation because it merely regu-
lates the movement of a particular firearm in interstate commerce. We therefore believe
it is entirely appropriate to examine prior enactments and legislation in determining the
constitutionality of § 922(o).
Id. at 1521 n.4. Yet quite obviously, § 922(o) is not a law that "merely regulates the movement of a
particular firearm in interstate commerce." Id. A ban on interstate machine gun sales would be such
a law. A ban on simple intrastate possession is not the same as a ban on interstate sales.
91. Id. at 1521 (quoting Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 249) (citations omitted).
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rather, to control their interstate movement by proscribing transfer or
possession.
92
The "evidence" of this supposed Congressional intent was the Congres-
sional statements involving the enactment of the 1968 GCA, plus generic
statements (having nothing to do with machine guns) that FOPA was
intended to strengthen the GCA as a tool for fighting violent crime and
drug trafficking.
93
But the machine gun ban had nothing to do with fighting violent
crime or drug trafficking. As BATF itself had testified to Congress, dur-
ing hearings on a previous attempt to ban machine guns, the NFA was
working perfectly well. Machine guns which were properly registered
under the NFA were virtually never used in crime. 94
Nevertheless, heroic efforts to stretch the interstate commerce pow-
er were validated later in Gonzales v. Raich, where the Court's majority
ruled that a federal ban on the legal (under state law) cultivation of medi-
cal marijuana exclusively for personal use was a legitimate incident to
Congress's efforts to prohibit an interstate market in marijuana.95 Ap-
parently the personal cultivation of legal medical marijuana would re-
duce the demand for interstate illegal marijuana, thereby reducing the
market price for the illegal marijuana. And the effect on price, in turn,
meant that Congress could control personal medical cultivation under its
power to regulate interstate commerce.
96
Wilks also argued, creatively, that the National Firearms Act defini-
tions are unconstitutionally vague.9 7 At the least, they certainly are odd.
The NFA applies itself to "firearms." But a "firearm" for NFA purposes
is not a "firearm" in normal English usage. The NFA applies to only a
small fraction of actual firearms-namely machine guns, short shotguns,
short rifles, and a few other types. And a NFA "firearm" includes many
things which are obviously not firearms: namely certain explosive devic-
es, such as rockets and grenades, and, of course, "silencers." The NFA's
definitions section is clear enough; a "silencer" is explicitly defined as a
NFA "firearm." 98 So the law is similar to a "National Cow Act" which
92. Id. at 1522 (quoting Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 248-49).
93. Id.
94. Armor Piercing Ammunition and the Criminal Misuse and Availability of Machineguns
and Silencers: Hearing on H.R. 641 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 117 (1984) (statement of Stephen Higgins, Dir. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) ("[It is highly unusual-and in fact, it is very, very rare" for
registered machineguns to be used in crime.).
95. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005).
96. Id.
97. Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1522.
98. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5845(a) (West 2009) ("The term 'firearm' means ... (7) any silencer (as
defined in section 921 of title 18, United States Code)"); 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(24) (West 2009)
("The terms 'firearm silencer' and 'firearm muffler' mean any device for silencing, muffling, or
diminishing the report of a portable firearm, including any combination of parts, designed or rede-
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defines a "cow" to include only Holstein cows, but also states that chick-
ens and pianos are a type of "cow."
It is an interesting question whether a legal definition which is 1)
clear, but 2) patently false and nonsensical, could be considered void for
vagueness. But Wilks had not preserved the issue for appeal, and the
Tenth Circuit did not have to decide the issue.
VIII. BAER: MORE (BUT NOT MUCH MORE) ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Regarding pro se lawyering, there is a saying that a man who
represents himself has a fool for a client. 99 The observation may not be
true in all cases, but it was in United States v. Baer.
100
The Tenth Circuit's 1977 decision in Oakes had announced a
Second Amendment result based on "logic" and "policy" and what was
"apparent," but had not made any logical or policy arguments, and had
not pointed out any "apparent" facts.10 For twenty-three years, the
Tenth Circuit had offered not one more word of Second Amendment
analysis. In Baer, the Circuit went further, adding an entire paragraph to
its thin corpus of Second Amendment analysis.
Baer was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm,102 and of possessing firearms with obliterated serial numbers. 103
He argued that the felon-in-possession ban exceeded Congressional pow-
er post-Lopez, a claim which the Tenth Circuit rejected, citing its own
precedent that the ban was constitutional, because the ban only applied to
firearms which had at some point been transferred in interstate com-
merce.104
He also raised a Ninth Amendment claim, which was speedily dis-
missed with a citation to other Circuit Courts which rejected the notion
of a Ninth Amendment right to arms. 05 The dissent did not address any
signed, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, and
any part intended only for use in such assembly or fabrication.").
99. The quote is often attributed, incorrectly, to Abraham Lincoln. RALPH KEYES, THE
QUOTE VERIFIER 128 (2006).
100. 235 F.3d 561 (10th Cir. 2000).
101. United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977).
102. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2009).
103. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(k) (West 2009).
104. Baer, 235 F.3d at 563 (citing United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995)).
The machine gun ban, discussed supra, is not limited to machine guns that have been transferred in
interstate commerce.
105. Id. at 564 (citing San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11 th Cir.1997), vacated in part on other
grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (1 1th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1041 (5th Cir.
1996)).
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of the arguments in Nicholas Johnson's 1992 Rutgers Law Journal ar-
ticle on the Ninth Amendment and the right to arns.106
Presumably, Baer, as a pro se litigant, had not done an excellent job
in presenting the Ninth Amendment argument. But the Tenth Circuit
went too far with its breezy rejection pronouncement against any Ninth
Amendment right to arms. If the panel did not want to write a serious
analysis of the Ninth Amendment issue, the panel simply could have
pointed out that there is no authority for the proposition that convicted
felons have a Ninth Amendment right to own guns, or that there is a
Ninth Amendment right to firearms which have obliterated serial num-
bers.
In future years, it would be best to understand Baer, in regards to
the Ninth Amendment, as standing for nothing more than the above two
propositions. The panel never even attempted to engage the merits of a
Ninth Amendment analysis as applied to law-abiding citizens, and Baer
should not be treated as if the panel had engaged the issue.
Baer had also raised the Second Amendment. The panel responded
with a scornful footnote:
Mr. Baer also makes the time-worn argument that his conviction vi-
olates the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court has long held
that "the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the pre-
servation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."' Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83
L.Ed. 1206 (1939)). The Court in Lewis concluded that federal legis-
lation regulating the receipt and possession of firearms by felons
"do[es] not trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties," in-
cluding those guaranteed by the Second Amendment. Id. In light of
this authority, the circuits have consistently upheld the constitutional-
ity of federal weapons regulations like section 922(g) absent evi-
dence that they in any way affect the maintenance of a well regulated
militia. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th
Cir.1995); see also Wright, 117 F.3d at 1271-74 (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 922(o), which bars possession of machine gun, against
Second Amendment challenge); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d
1016, 1018-1020 (same); United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318,
1320 (8th Cir.1988) (upholding Switchblade Knife Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1242, against Second Amendment challenge); United States v.
Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir.1977) (upholding 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d), which bars possession of unregistered machine gun, against
106. See generally Johnson, supra note 26.
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Second Amendment challenge). Mr. Baer's prosecution did not vi-
olate the Second Amendment.
10 7
Lewis was a 1980 Supreme Court case involving a Sixth Amend-
ment challenge to the felon in possession ban. The Second Amendment
had not been raised or briefed by any party. 08 Still, the Court did in-
clude the footnote with the above-quoted language.' ° 9 Although it is
possible to argue about what Lewis means, the Tenth Circuit's quotation
of Lewis was at least a plausible interpretation of Lewis as rejecting the
notion of a constitutionally protected right to arms. (The narrower read-
ing of Lewis is simply that it affirms that convicted felons have no right
to arms.)
It was reasonable for the Tenth Circuit, in 2000, to update its 1977
Second Amendment analysis by citing dicta from a footnote in a 1980
U.S. Supreme Court case. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit, in its 2000
update, paid no attention at all to what the Supreme Court had written
about the Second Amendment in the text of a 1990 opinion, United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. There, the Court had explained that "the
people" was a constitutional "term of art" which had the same meaning
in the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.1 0
It is difficult to square the Tenth Circuit's insistence that "the right
of the people to keep and bear arms" applies only to members of state
militias with the Supreme Court's rule that "the people" in the Second
Amendment are just the same as "the people" who are protected by the
First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.
It is true that ingenious arguments can be made to get around what
seems to be Verdugo's plain language." 1 But the Tenth Circuit did not
offer any such arguments about Verdugo. Rather, the Circuit acted as if
Verdugo did not exist. This was the style of the Tenth Circuit's treat-
ment of the Second Amendment in the late twentieth century: not to re-
fute the strongest authorities and arguments in favor of an ordinary indi-
vidual right in the Second Amendment, but simply to refuse to address
them at all.
107. Baer, 235 F.3d at 564.
108. See infra note 193.
109. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
110. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
11I. See Brief for Brady Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26-28, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at
http://www.gurapossessky.comnews/parker/documents/07-290tsacBradyCenter.pdf.
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IX. HANEY: THE MACHINE GUN BAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
POWER, AND THE FOUR-PART TEST
John Lee Haney is one of the many litigants who have made terrible
Second Amendment law by bringing poorly prepared cases. 12
John Lee Haney walked into a police station, engaged an officer in
conversation, and told him that he owned semiautomatic and fully
automatic guns. He stated that they were not licensed and that the
federal government lacks authority to require him to get a license.
Through a combination of Haney's consent and a warrant, the author-
ities found two fully automatic guns in Haney's car and house. Ha-
ney also had literature on how to convert a semiautomatic gun to a
fully automatic gun. Haney had converted one of the guns himself
and had constructed the other out of parts. He admitted possessing
them. 
13
The case was preposterous. Had Haney consulted a competent at-
torney, he would have found that:
" The Tenth Circuit had already rejected the idea of Second
Amendment rights for anyone outside the National Guard in
Oakes, in 1977. 14
* The Tenth Circuit has already rejected the idea that, even post-
Lopez, Congress cannot use the interstate commerce power to
ban machine gun possession." 
5
" Haney's semi-automatic arms were entirely legal, and thus could
not be used to set up any kind of test case.
Addressing the Second Amendment, Judge Ebel briefly quoted from
Miller and Lewis, with no greater length nor depth of analysis than had
been used in Oakes or Baer. (Judge Ebel was on the panel in Baer.) The
opinion also quoted from Oakes itself.
There was one slightly novel (from a Tenth Circuit standpoint) iota
of analysis. Namely the assertion:
Consistent with these cases, we hold that a federal criminal
gun-control law does not violate the Second Amendment unless it
112. See United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001).
113. Id. at 1163.
114. Perhaps Haney had drawn hope from the circuit's hint about the "brooding omnipresence"
in Wilks in 1995. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 n.2 (1995). But in 2000-after Haney
had gotten himself arrested, but before the Tenth Circuit heard his appeal-another panel, in Baer,
had slammed the door on revising the circuit's approach to the Second Amendment. See United
States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561 (10th Cir. 2000).
115. Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1519.
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impairs the state's ability to maintain a well-regulated militia. This is
simply a straightforward reading of the text of the Second Amend-
ment. 
1 16
To say the least, Judge Ebel's interpretation is hardly a "straightforward
reading of the text." The text protects "right of the people." It takes a
rather circuitous reading to transpose "the militia" (whose importance is
extolled in the first part of the Amendment) from the opening clause of
the Amendment into the main clause of the Amendment, so that the
Amendment is somehow read "the right of state militiamen to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed."
The Heller opinion itself-with a 5-4 split in which each side ar-
gued vehemently about the text of the Second Amendment-
demonstrates the incorrectness of Judge Ebel's claim that his militia-only
reading of the Second Amendment was "simply a straightforward read-
ing of the text." The Ebel reading was the one which four Supreme
Court Justices adopted, so it might be characterized as an intellectually
plausible reading. But it was hardly an obvious, "straightforward" read-
ing-as shown by the fact that five Supreme Court Justices had a differ-
ent reading.
Moreover, at the time that Haney was decided, there were many Su-
preme Court opinions which had treated the Second Amendment as a
normal (not a militia-only) individual right, usually to make a point about
something else (e.g., Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of another
right).117 Judge Ebel adroitly avoided mention of any of these cases (in-
cluding the 1990 Verdugo-Urquidez decision) by writing, "There are two
twentieth-century Supreme Court cases discussing the Second Amend-
ment in what appear to be holdings. ' 18 Describing the Second Amend-
ment footnote in Lewis, a case involving the Sixth Amendment, as a
"holding" was something of a stretch. But more importantly, Judge
Ebel's careful phrasing-which limited his written opinion to considera-
tion of a mere two of the thirty-six Supreme Court cases which men-
tioned the Second Amendment-indicated that he was aware of at least
some of those thirty-four other cases. The vast majority of those cases
were not only inconsistent with Haney; they also showed the patent ab-
surdity of Judge Ebel's claim that the militia-only view was the
"straightforward reading" of the Second Amendment, for from the Early
116. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1164.
117. See David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases, 18 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 99 (1999). This article is critiqued in David Yassky, The Sound Of Silence: The
Supreme Court And the Second Amendment-A Response to Professor Kopel, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 189 (1999). My reply is The Sounds of the Supremes: A Reply to Professor Yassky, 18 ST.
LOuis U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1999). For another critique, see Robert Hardaway, Elizabeth Gormley
& Bryan Taylor, The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the Second Amendment: Why the Supreme
Court Declines to Resolve the Debate Over the Right to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMM.
99 (2002).
118. Haney, 264 F.3dat 1164.
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Republic to the present, opinion after opinion from the United States
Supreme Court had read the Second Amendment differently from what
Judge Ebel declared was the "straightforward reading."
Judge Ebel then proffered a string cite to five cases from other Cir-
cuits. 19 The Haney opinion does not seem to notice that two of these
opinions actually had an entirely different theory of the Second Amend-
ment than did the Tenth Circuit. According to the Tenth Circuit, the
Second Amendment was an individual right which could only be exer-
cised by persons in state militias. According to two of the five cited cas-
es, the Second Amendment was not an individual right at all, but was a
"collective right" which belonged only to the government.' 20
But all five cases did stand for the Tenth Circuit's operative rule in
challenges to federal gun laws: 'The government always wins."
1 21
In Oakes, the panel had been unable to offer any reason for its pro-
nouncement that a person who was statutorily defined as a militiaman by
state law, and who belonged to a private organization which he claimed
was a militia, did not have Second Amendment rights. 22 The Haney
opinion did at least offer some argument for its claim that Haney was not
part of "the militia" protected by the Second Amendment. Oklahoma
law (like federal law) 123 classifies "the militia" into two groups: the "or-
ganized militia" is the National Guard and the State Guard.'" In Okla-
homa, the "unorganized militia" is all other able-bodied adult males aged
17 to 70.125 Judge Ebel argued that Haney had not shown that his partic-
ipation in the unorganized militia was "well-regulated by the State of
Oklahoma" or "that machineguns of the sort he possessed are used by the
militia, or that his possession was connected to any sort of militia ser-
vice.
'126
One might disagree with Haney's reasoning, but at least there was
some reasoning, making the decision much better than Oakes.
The Haney case announced a four-part test, which made it clear
that, even for persons in state militias, it would be essentially impossible
even to raise a Second Amendment claim:
As a threshold matter, he must show that (1) he is part of a state mili-
tia; (2) the militia, and his participation therein, is "well regulated"
119. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165.
120. United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,
185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116 (2000).
121. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165.
122. See United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978).
123. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (West 2009).
124. OKLA. STAT. ANN. Trr. 44, § 41 (West 2009).
125. Id. For the federal militia, the age range is 17 to 45. 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (West 2009).
126. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165.
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by the state; (3) machineguns are used by that militia; and (4) his
possession of the machinegun was reasonably connected to his mili-
tia service. 127
Regarding the issue of post-Lopez congressional power to ban ma-
chine gun possession, the Haney court restated the Wilks analysis at
length. Haney also string-cited the other federal circuit decisions
upholding 18 U.S.C. 922(o).128 But Haney did not mention the Fifth
Circuit's en banc case on the issue, United States v. Kirk, in which the
ban survived only by an 8-8 vote. 129 The Third Circuit's decision in Ry-
bar was cited, but there was no discussion of the arguments raised by
Judge Alito's dissenting opinion in that case.130  As was the standard
practice in the Tenth Circuit on firearms issues, the panel simply refused
to acknowledge that there was anyone (other than the criminal defen-
dants at bar) who thought that there might be the slightest constitutional
impediment to gun prohibition.
Wilks had upheld the machine gun ban because machine guns are
(supposedly) like railroads and Internet backbones: "instrumentalities of
interstate commerce." They allegedly become such instrumentalities
because by their very nature they are bought and sold across state
lines. t3 '
But Haney had not bought or sold any machine guns, not even with-
in his own county. He had converted his own semi-automatic guns to
automatic. (If not for 922(o), he could have done so lawfully under the
National Firearms Act by paying a tax and registering them.) Haney
asserted, with no supporting argument, that the federal ban on post-1986
machine gun possession is also legitimate under the third Lopez prong:
"regulating activities that substantially affect interstate commerce., 132 It
is very difficult to see how the home conversion of a semi-automatic gun
to an automatic gun has more of an effect on interstate commerce than
does the carrying of guns in school zones. It borders on the absurd to say
that the non-commercial production of machine guns for personal use has
(in the aggregate) more of an effect on interstate commerce than does
violence against women. And the Supreme Court, in Morrison, had just
127. Id. at 1165.
128. Id. at 1166-71 (citing United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998), United States
v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997), amended on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (1lth Cir.
1998), United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), United States v. Rybar,
103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996), United States v.
Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996), United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996),
United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
129. United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997). Kirk was cited elsewhere (without
mention that it was a case about machine guns, and had drawn eight dissenters on the very issue at
bar in Haney) for a point about the standard of review. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1167.
130. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 286-94 (Alito, J., dissenting).
131. Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1521.
132. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1170-71.
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applied Lopez to find part of the federal Violence Against Women Act
unconstitutional.
133
Haney distinguished Morrison by claiming that Morrison ruled
against VAWA because violence against women is not an economic ac-
tivity.134 But if beating up a woman during the course of a robbery is not
an economic activity, then neither is changing the functioning of a gun
you already own.
Glenn Reynolds and Brannon Denning have observed that lower
federal courts have, in essence, nullified Lopez, refusing to extend it
beyond its facts, and upholding laws by using reasoning which Lopez
explicitly rejects. 135 Haney and Wilks fit with the Reynolds-Denning
paradigm, insofar as they claim that machine guns are naturally inter-
state, or that the aggregate effect of home conversion of one's own gun
from semi-automatic to automatic has a "substantial" effect on interstate
commerce.
Haney, however, builds extensively on the idea which had been
sketchily developed in Wilks: that the ban on personal possession (and
even personal manufacture) was necessary for Congress to regulate the
interstate market in machine guns. 136 This type of analysis was later va-
lidated by the Supreme Court in Raich.137 Even if one disagrees with the
Haney-Raich reasoning, at least it was extensive reasoning. This one
sub-section of the Haney opinion was more thorough than all of the
Tenth Circuit's analysis (including the analysis in Haney itself) of the
Second Amendment, combined, thus far.
X. GRAHAM: LICENSES FOR EXPLOSIVES DEALERS, THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW
Graham was convicted of selling explosives without a license.
138
On appeal, one of his claims was that requiring a federal license for ex-
plosives dealers 139 violated the Second Amendment.
He argued that explosives "have a common use in military training
exercises," that there is an "individual right to participate in militia train-
ing exercises and to keep and bear arms needed by a militiaman," and
that "[t]hese rights would mean little if he could not purchase or sell
these arms."
133. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
134. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1168.
135. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Interpretations of Lopez, Or
What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REv.
369 (2000).
136. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1168-70.
137. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
138. United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2002).
139. 18 U.S.C.A. § 842(a)(1) (West 2009).
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Graham quickly reprised Haney, and observed that Graham was not
part of the state militia. He was part of a group called "Organization,"
which acted as an independent militia. But since Organization was not
recognized by the state, it was not a part of the "well-regulated militia,"
which was the only type of group whose members had Second Amend-
ment rights. Indeed, even if Organization were recognized by the state,
and were highly organized, the fact that Organization was not part of the
state's National Guard meant that Organization was not part of the "or-
ganized" militia, and therefore was not "a well-regulated militia."
' 140
The Graham opinion added that even if the defendant had Second
Amendment rights, those rights were subject to "reasonable regulation,"
and that requiring a license for explosive dealers was a reasonable regu-
lation.
Heller did not formally articulate a Second Amendment standard of
review, but Justice Breyer's dissent argued for a reasonableness standard,
and the Heller majority opinion explicitly rejected that approach.
41
Thus, Graham cannot be considered good law any more, on any
part of its Second Amendment analysis. However, as detailed supra, it
may be that explosives (other than gunpowder) are not Second Amend-
ment arms, if they are not considered to be the type of arms commonly
used by law-abiding citizens for legitimate purposes. 1
42
If explosives are Second Amendment arms, dealer licensing is
probably constitutional, given Heller's explicit affirmation of laws regu-
lating the commercial sale of arms. 143
Graham does contain one step towards an appropriate standard of
review. Besides finding that licensing law was "reasonable," the court
also stated that it was "sufficiently tailored."'144 This is not quite the
"narrow tailoring" that the First Amendment requires for time, place, and
manner regulation, but it is a sort of back-handed acknowledgement of
that standard. First Amendment time/place/manner analysis is very use-
ful and appropriate (one might say "well-tailored") for analysis of many
gun controls under the Second Amendment.
145
140. Graham, 305 F.3d at 1106.
141. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (Scalia, J.). Id. at 2847
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's view cannot be correct unless it can show that the Dis-
trict's regulation is unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.").
142. United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2002).
143. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 ("laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commer-
cial sale of arms" are not per se violations of the Second Amendment).
144. Graham, 305 F.3d at 1106.
145. See, e.g., Gary E. Barnett, Note, Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 607, 608 (2008).
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XI. LUCERO
Richard Joseph Lucero converted two semi-automatic rifles into
machine guns, and sold them to an undercover agent.146 He was con-
victed of violating the 1986 ban on machine guns.
He argued that he was a member of the unorganized militia, and at
trial, presented expert testimony "that machineguns have reasonable
military uses and are in fact used by the military." 147 But his argument
was hopeless in light of the recently-decided Haney, because Lucero was
not a member of the organized component of a state militia. 148
The most interesting part of the unpublished opinion was the con-
currence by Judge Carlos Lucero. He had run for the Democratic nomi-
nation for United States Senate in 1990. His opponent was gun control
advocate Josie Heath, and Lucero contrasted his position with hers: "I
believe the Second Amendment means what it says."
149
The U.S. Department of Justice agreed. By the time that the Lucero
case reached the Tenth Circuit, the Attorney General had adopted the
position (held by many previous Attorneys General, but not by Janet
Reno)150 that the Second Amendment guarantees an ordinary individual
right.151  The change from the Reno to the Ashcroft position had come
after the government's brief in Lucero had been filed. Accordingly, the
U.S. Attorney's office moved to modify its answer, and, as a matter of
courtesy, to allow the defendant to rebrief the Second Amendment.
1 52
The two-judge majority of Tacha and Hartz refused to allow the ad-
ditional briefing. Judge Lucero's concurrence said that he would have
allowed the rebriefing on the Second Amendment. He also wrote:
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, and would af-
firm. Even were we to accept the proposition that the defendant has
an individual right under the Second Amendment "to keep and bear
Arms" in order to serve in "[a] well regulated Militia" subject to call
146. United States v. Lucero, 43 Fed. App'x. 299, 2002 WL 1750878 (10th Cir. 2002).
147. Id. at 301.
148. Id.
149. Art Branscombe, The Perfect Primary, COLO. STATESMAN, Aug. 10, 1990, at 10. Thus,
to Lucero, unlike to the Baer panel, the "straightforward" reading of "the right of the people to keep
and bear arms" was that people have a right to own and carry guns.
150. Brief for Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of the Department of Justice in Support of
Respondent at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at
http://tinyurl.com/cngu6j.
151. Memorandum to All United States' Attorneys from the Attorney General, Re: United
States v. Emerson (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/emerson.htm.
152. The U.S. Attorney's motion to amend its brief was filed on June 24, 2002. The original
brief had been filed in April 2002 (and was termed "deficient" by the Tenth Circuit, because it had
the wrong color cover, and was a day late). Appellee's Motion to Modify Argument in Its Answer
Brief, United States v. Lucero, 43 F. App'x 299, 2002 WL 1750878 (10th Cir. June 24, 2002). Since
the Ashcroft memorandum had been distributed in November 2001, the New Mexico U.S. Attor-
ney's office did not appear to have a good excuse for having filed, half a year later, a brief that
violated Department of Justice policy.
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by a "free State," I am not persuaded that the semi-automatic and ful-
ly automatic "machineguns" which defendant sold to federal agents,
and which have been outlawed by federal legislation, are the type of
arms subject to Second Amendment protection. For that reason I
would affirm the judgment of the district court. 153
The above paragraph is, of course, not a detailed analysis of the issues,
but detailed analysis is generally not expected from concurrences in un-
published opinions.
Judge Lucero's conclusion that machine guns are not part of the
Second Amendment right appears to have been vindicated by Heller.I5
As to the semi-automatics that were involved in the particular case,
Judge Lucero was not "persuaded" that they were protected by the
Second Amendment. Presumably, in a post-Heller case, he would have
an open mind to a full exposition on the merits of whether such guns are
the type "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purpos-
es.' 55
XII. BAYLES: GUN POSSESSION BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO A PROTECTIVE
ORDER
In 1994, Congress amended the Gun Control Act to prohibit gun
possession by persons subject to domestic violence protective orders.'
5 6
In 1999, a Utah trial court issued a protective order against Bayles,
ordering him to stay away from his ex-wife and her new husband.157 The
order was a standard boilerplate form. The Utah judge did not check the
box on the form which would have prohibited Bayles from owning
guns.1
58
153. Lucero, 43 F. App'x at 301-02 (Lucero, J., concurring).
154. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
155. Id. at 2815.
156. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8) (West 2009):
It shall be unlawful for any person...
who is subject to a court order that-(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person
received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of
such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that
would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child;
and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safe-
ty of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause
bodily injury...
157. United States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2002).
158. Id. at 1304-05.
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Bayles was a gun collector. Federal agents launched an undercover
investigation, which led to his conviction for violation of the federal
law. 159
The Tenth Circuit speedily disposed of his Second Amendment
challenge, citing Haney and Baer, and pointing out that Bayles was not a
member of the militia, and had not satisfied any of the four parts of the
Haney test.1 60  The Bayles court acknowledged that a federal district
court in Texas had recently found that the federal ban on subjects of a
restraining order violated the Second Amendment, as applied to a partic-
ular defendant. But, as the Bayles court noted, the Fifth Circuit's dispo-
sition of the appeal had been to affirm the validity of the federal ban.'
6
1
(The Tenth Circuit delicately avoided mentioning that the Fifth Circuit
had held that the Second Amendment is an ordinary individual right, not
a militia-only right.)
162
Unlike the gun zone statute in Lopez, or the machine gun ban in 18
U.S.C. § 922(o), the protective order ban had an explicit jurisdictional
component: the gun must have been moved in interstate commerce.
(Presumably, then, the ban would not apply to the possession of a gun
that never left the state of its manufacture.) The Tenth Circuit, like other
Circuits, 163 ruled that this was a sufficient basis for use of the interstate
commerce power.' 64
So if a gun were manufactured in Massachusetts in 1922, and sold
in Utah in 1923, and never left Utah thereafter, its possession within
Utah in 1999 could still be prohibited under the congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce. This might be considered the Herpes
Theory of Interstate Commerce; one act of interstate commerce will at-
tach to an object for the rest of the object's life, no matter how long.
The Tenth Circuit also reversed the district court's downward de-
parture from the Sentencing Guidelines, based on the fact (which was
159. Id. at 1305-06.
160. Id. at 1307; see also United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2000).
161. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1307 (discussing United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610
(N.D.Tex.1999)); see also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 210, 265 (5th Cir. 2001).
162. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1307.
163. Id. at 1308 (citing United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Unlike the
statute at issue in Lopez, Section 922(g) expressly requires the government to prove that the firearm
was ship[ped] or transport[ed] in interstate or foreign commerce; was possess[ed] in or affect[ed]
commerce; or is received after having been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce."); Napier, 233 F.3d at 402 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Section 922(g)(8) ... does contain a jurisdic-
tional element that establishes that it was enacted in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate inter-
state commerce in firearms and ammunition."); United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514-15 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("[Elvery Court of Appeals that has considered this question has concluded that §
922(g)(8) is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause."); United States v.
Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that 922(g)(8) "contains a jurisdictional element
that brings it within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause")).
164. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1308. The Tenth Circuit had used the same approach for the federal
ban on gun possession by convicted felons. See United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586 (10th
Cir. 2000).
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disputed, but which the district court had found in Bayles' favor) that he
did not know he was prohibited under federal law. As the district court
had noted, one very important fact was that the state restraining order
which Bayles received had a box to prohibit firearms possession, and that
box was not checked.
165
The Tenth Circuit cited cases from sister circuits holding that ignor-
ance of the law was not a defense to conviction for the crime itself. As
the Tenth Circuit admitted, none of these cases addressed whether ignor-
ance could be a justification for a downward departure in sentencing.
But these cases were enough for the Tenth Circuit to find the downward
departure invalid as a matter of law. Appropriately, one of the cited cas-
es was United States v. Kafka. 166 The very fact that there were so many
cases involving the restraining order statute in which the defendant had
no idea that he was banned from owning guns, the Tenth Circuit argued,
proved that the case of the ignorant Bayles was not outside the "heart-
land" of cases involving the statute; hence, he did not qualify for a
downward departure. 67 Post-Heller, mistake may be a viable defense in
some cases, as a district court in Pennsylvania held, in a case involving
man who had very good reason to believe that he was not a convicted
felon.
168
165. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1304-06, 1309-13.
166. Id. at 1311 (citing United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 2000)).
167. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1304-06, 1309-13. The opinion acknowledged that a downward
departure might be legitimate if a defendant had been actually misled by a federal district judge or
by his lawyer about what the law required. But Bayles' lawyer had told him, in effect, that he was in
a gray zone, and it would be prudent to get rid of his guns, and Bayles had in fact gotten rid of most
of his guns.
168. See United States v. Kitsch, No. 03-594-01, slip op., 2008 WL 2971548, at *1, *3 to *7
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2008). In Kitsch, the defendant was working as an informant for law enforcement
officials in New Jersey.
As a means of helping the narcotics officer with whom he was working.... Kitsch set a
small, smoky fire on the windowsill of the barn and then promptly called the fire depart-
ment .... As a result of the fire, Kitsch was charged with third-degree arson, a felony
under both New Jersey and federal law. He pled guilty to the state offense after meeting
with law enforcement officials who told him they would set aside the conviction and
Kitsch could live as though the event had never happened. Although he served a thirty-
day custodial sentence on Sundays, Kitsch avers that he truly and reasonably believed
that his conviction had either been set aside or expunged.
Thus, "in order to convict Kitsch, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knew or was willfully blind to the fact that he had a prior felony conviction that had not been set
aside or expunged." Among the rationales for the district court's conclusion was the Second
Amendment:
A statute that imposes criminal penalties for the exercise of an enumerated constitutional
right despite defendant's reasonable belief in good faith that he has complied with the law
must, at the very least, raise constitutional doubts. Post-Heller, the Government's desired
construction of Section 922(g)(1) imposes just such a burden on defendants who, for
whatever reason, reasonably believe that they are not felons within the statutory defini-
tion. Faced with a statute that raises this sort of doubt, it is "incumbent upon us to read
the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress."
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As for the constitutionality of the gun ban for targets of a protective
order, it has been upheld in one post-Heller case. That court did suggest
the ban would be unconstitutional if applied (as the federal statute al-
lows) in a situation where the protective order was issued without a find-
ing that the defendant had used, attempted, or threatened to use vi-
olence. 169 Lower courts have also upheld the federal ban on gun posses-
sion by persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors.
170
XLI. WYNNE: ANOTHER RESTRAINING ORDER
Having thoroughly discussed the restraining order issue in Bayles,
the Tenth Circuit did not publish its opinion in United States v. Wynne,
another case involving the same subsection of the Gun Control Act.
17
Wynne's Second Amendment argument was quickly rejected with
citations to Bayles and Baer (misspelled as "Baur"), pointing out that
Wynne had not satisfied the four-part test in Haney.1
72
A protective order against Wynne was issued in 1994. In 1997, the
order was revised to reflect the new address of the protected person, Lisa
Foreman. 
1 73
The federal law applies only to restraining orders issued after the
subject had notice and an opportunity to appear. 74 Wynne had notice
and opportunity for the 1994 order but not for the 1997 order. His argu-
ment to the Tenth Circuit was that the 1997 order replaced the 1994 or-
der, and therefore there was no longer any valid (for purposes of the Gun
See also State v. Williams, 148 P.3d 993, 995-96 (Wash. 2006) (writing that strict liability readings
of gun control statutes are strongly disfavored under the Second Amendment and the Washington
state constitutional right to arms).
169. United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020-26 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (indicating that
Heller stated that bans on felons and the mentally ill are constitutional; the Heller language should
be understood as providing examples (not an exclusive list) of the type of people who can be prohi-
bited: namely, people who have been proven to be dangerous; persons subject to a domestic vi-
olence order based on particularized finding of violence can be prohibited).
170. United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163-65 (D. Me. 2008) (suggesting that the
federal statute on domestic violence, prohibiting gun possession by a person who has been convicted
of "the use or attempted use of physical force" in domestic violence, is actually a closer fit for identi-
fying dangerously violent persons who might misuse guns than is the federal ban on gun possession
by convicted felons, since many felons are non-violent); see also United States v. White, No. 07-
0036 1-WS, slip op., 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008).
171. United States v. Wynne, No. 01-6386, slip op., 2003 WL 42508, at *1 (10th Cir. 2003)
(not selected for publication).
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id. at * 1, 4-6.
174. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8) (West 2009):
(A) [the order] was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice,
and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) [the order] restrains the
person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner... ; and (C) [the or-
der] by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force ....
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Control Act) restraining order which would prohibit him from having
guns.
175
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the 1994 order
was still in effect, and that whatever had happened in 1997 was just an
attempted technical change of the 1994 order, and not a new order.
76
XIV. RHODES
Jimmy Eugene Rhodes ran a methamphetamine lab, and was caught
in possession of stolen firearms. 177 His Second Amendment challenge to
the federal ban on gun possession by convicted felons was rejected with
a short citation of Baer, and the observation that three-judge panels can-
not overrule previous panels. Notably, the Rhodes opinion simply cited
Baer for the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute, and did
not discuss Rhodes' non-membership in the militia.
178
XV. PARKER
Ever since the early 1980s, that "brooding omnipresence' '179 of the
Second Amendment had become more and more powerful. In 1982, the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution investigated the Second
Amendment, and issued a lengthy report in which all the Democrats and
Republicans on the Subcommittee agreed that the Second Amendment is
a normal individual right. 80 In 1986, Congress passed the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act (FOPA) by huge bipartisan majorities in both
houses, 181 and FOPA declared the Second Amendment to be an individu-
al right of all Americans. 182
175. Wynne, 2003 WL 42508, at *4-5.
176. Id. at *5-6.
177. United States v. Rhodes, No. 02-6280, 62 F. App'x. 869, 870-72, 2003 WL 1565166, at
*1-2 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2003) (unpublished).
178. Id. at 875-76.
179. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995).
180. SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE,
97TH CONG., 2D SESSION, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982), available at
http://www.guncite.com/joumals/senrpt/senrpt.html.
181. FOPA passed the Senate 79-15, with thirty Democrats in favor and thirteen opposed.
Among the Democratic senators voting in favor were Joe Biden and Al Gore. FOPA passed the
House 292-130, with Democrats voting 131 in favor and 115 opposed. The lead House sponsor,
Harold Volkmer, was a Democrat. 131 CONG. REC. DOOOOO-02 (1985), 1985 WL 714108.
182.
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS--The Congress finds that--
(1) the rights of citizens--
(A) to keep and bear arms under the second amendment to the United States Constitution;
(B) to security against illegal and unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment;
(C) against uncompensated taking of property, double jeopardy, and assurance of due
process of law under the fifth amendment; and
(D) against unconstitutional exercise of authority under the ninth and tenth amendments;
require additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and enforcement poli-
cies; and
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A 1983 article by Don Kates in the Michigan Law Review183 began
what eventually became a flood of law review articles on the Second
Amendment. The most eminent Professors of Constitutional Law-
including Sanford Levinson, 184 Akhil Amar,
185 William Van Alstyne,186
and even Larry Tribe' 87 -wrote articles and treatises affirming the Stan-
dard Model.
The American public demonstrated its belief in the continuing im-
portance of the right to keep and bear arms. In recent decades, twenty
states added or strengthened right to arms provisions in the state constitu-
tions, always doing so by enormous majorities--even in liberal states
such as Wisconsin. 1
88
And if, as Mr. Dooley said, the courts follow the election returns,
the Democrats lost the House of Representatives in 1994,189 and Al Gore
lost the Presidency in 2000 because of public backlash at gun control-at
least according to President Clinton's analysis of those elections.
t90
Even if the judges on the Circuit were not paying attention to state
constitutional law developments all over the nation, or to the newspapers,
or the law reviews, or to the Senate subcommittee on the Constitution,
the judges were surely reading the briefs filed in the Tenth Circuit by the
U.S. Department of Justice. And since 2001 those briefs were politely
but relentlessly telling the Tenth Circuit that the Circuit was wrong, and
the Second Amendment was a meaningful right. (Of course those briefs
(2) additional legislation is required to reaffirm the intent of the Congress, as expressed in
section 101 of the Gun Control Act of 1968, that "it is not the purpose of this title to place
any undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with re-
spect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of hunt-
ing, trapshooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other lawful activity, and
that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of
firearms by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."
Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1(b) (100 Stat. 449) (1986).
183. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983).
184. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
185. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J 1131 (1991); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J 1193
(1992).
186. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1236 (1994).
187. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894-903 (3d ed. 2000).
188. Since 1963, the people of Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin chose, either through their legislature
or through a direct vote, to add a right to arms to their state constitution, to re-adopt the right to
arms, or to strengthen an existing right. In every state where the people had the opportunity to vote
directly, they voted for the right to arms by overwhelming margins. For example, in 1998 Wiscon-
sin adopted a guarantee by a vote of 1,205,873 to 425,052; in 1986, West Virginia adopted its guar-
antee by a vote of 342,963 to 67,168.
189. See Alex Machaskee et al, Editorial, A Conversation with President Clinton, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 14, 1995, at lIB ("The NRA is the reason the Republicans control the
House.").
190. BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 629-30 (2004).
[Vol. 86:3
2009] THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 943
also argued that the various federal laws about prohibited persons who
should not have guns were still valid.)
But if all you knew about the Second Amendment was what you
had read in published Tenth Circuit opinions since Oakes was decided in
1977, you would think that nothing had changed since then. Indeed, you
would think that nothing of importance had ever been said or written
about the Second Amendment, other than the Supreme Court's 1939
Miller decision.
The one, and only one, post-1977 development you would know
about would be that in a 1980 case involving the Sixth Amendment, Jus-
tice Blackmun had written a two-sentence footnote which seemed com-
patible with the militiamen-only reading of Miller.19t You would have
seen Tenth Circuit citations to this favorite footnote'92--coming from a
case in which neither party had mentioned the Second Amendment. 1
93
If all you knew were what the Tenth Circuit told you, you would not
know about the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court case of Verdugo-Urquidez in
which the briefing-and the Ninth Circuit opinion which was being re-
viewed--did include the Second Amendment. In that case, the Court
explained that "the people" was a "term of art" which had the same
meaning in the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. 194
Nor would you know about Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in
Printz, in which he argued that Miller did not stand for a militia-only
right to arms, and neither did anything else in the Court's prior decisions
stand for the principle that the right is militia-only. t95 The concurrence
also made it rather clear that Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Story
that the right to keep and bear arms is "the palladium of the liberties of a
republic."'
196
But back in the hermetically sealed world of the Tenth Circuit, the
only news about the Second Amendment was that the cites to anti-
Standard Model decisions from sister circuits got updated every so often.
You would know that the Fifth Circuit had decided a gun control case
191. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
192. United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 563 (10th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Ha-
ney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2001).
193. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 n.25 (2008) (stating that the Lewis
court suggested that "[n]o Second Amendment claim was raised or briefed by any party. In the
course of rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented gratuitously, in a footnote .... It is
inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill
of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not ar-
gued.").
194. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
195. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 939.
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called United States v. Emerson in 2001,197 but you would not know that
the Fifth Circuit had adopted the Standard Model.
Indeed, in the quarter-century of published opinions after Oakes,
there was little to suggest that anyone other than felons thought that the
Second Amendment protects Americans who are not in the National
Guard.
1 98
In short, the Tenth Circuit's quarter-century record on the Second
Amendment was one of arrogance and timidity: arrogance in the tone
and scope of its pronouncements on the Second Amendment, and timidi-
ty about addressing any of the growing body of law and scholarship
which made it more and more clear that the Tenth Circuit's Potemkin
Village version of the militia-only Second Amendment was a sham.
Finally, in United States v. Parker, some glasnost began in the
Tenth Circuit.199 The two judge majority opinion actually acknowledged
an authority which did not support the Tenth Circuit's militia-only
view. 2 °
More importantly, Judge Kelly penned a concurring opinion which
described the last quarter-century for what it had been: judicial over-
reaching to trash an important constitutional right, in case after case
which easily could, and should, have been decided on much narrower
grounds.2°'
Dale Parker was a civilian employee at the U.S. Army's Dugway
Proving Ground, in Utah.2°2 Like every other state in the Tenth Circuit,
Utah has a "shall issue" system for licensing the carrying of concealed
handguns. A law-abiding adult can obtain a permit to carry a concealed
handgun for lawful protection, if the adult passes a background check
and a safety class.203 Utah is the only state in the Tenth Circuit which
197. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
198. Judges Anderson and Baldock (joined by a district judge sitting by designation), in Wilks,
had referred to the Second Amendment as "a brooding omnipresence" and "an orphan of the Bill of
Rights." United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995). In the unpublished Luce-
ro case, Judge Lucero had acknowledged the possibility that the Second Amendment could be inter-
preted as an individual right. United States v. Lucero, 43 F. App'x. 299, 301-02, 2002 WL 1750878,
at *2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2002) (Lucero, J., concurring) (unpublished). The 2003 unpublished opi-
nion in Rhodes had said that a three-judge panel could not overrule OakeslBaer/Haney on the
Second Amendment; the statement contained the implicit recognition that a different result on the
Second Amendment was at least theoretically possible. United States v. Rhodes, 62 F. App'x. 869,
875-76, 2003 WL 1565166, at *6 (10th Cir. March 27, 2003) (unpublished). The Tenth Circuit had
also noted that Slesarik, a pro se civil plaintiff in New Mexico, had raised a Second Amendment
claim as part of his Section 1983 suit, although the case was decided only with reference to the New
Mexico Constitution right to arms. Slesarik v. Luna County, 13 F.3d 406 (Table), 1993 WL 513843,
at *1-2 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993) (unpublished).
199. 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
200. Id. at 1283.
201. Id. at 1285-88 (Kelly, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 1280.
203. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-704 to -706 (LexisNexis 2009).
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requires such a permit for someone who wants to carry a protective gun
in his car.20
Inside the Dugway Proving Ground, a random search found a re-
volver in Parker's pick-up truck. He said that he had forgotten that it
was in the truck. He did not have a Utah carry permit, and was prosecut-
ed under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA). 20 5 The ACA authorizes
federal prosecutions for state law crimes that take place on federal prop-
erty within a state. 2°6 On appeal, Parker raised the Second and Tenth
Amendments.
The majority opinion written by Judge Briscoe and joined by Judge
McWilliams reprised the Circuit's familiar summaries of Miller and
Lewis. No new analysis of Miller was added, although the description of
the case added some detail; the description of Lewis added an additional
sentence of analysis (that the Supreme Court had used rational basis to
review a ban on firearms possession by a convicted felon.)
20 7
Then, glasnost: a tacit, indirect admission that Miller itself might be
ambiguous:
Miller has been interpreted [!] by this court and other courts to hold
that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the
right to keep and transport a firearm where there is no evidence that
possession of that firearm was related to the preservation or efficien-
cy of a well-regulated militia.
20 8
Then came cites to Lewis, to the Tenth Circuit's Oakes, and to three
sister circuit cases.209 Each of the sister circuit cites included a paren-
thetical which acknowledged that the anti-individual interpretation of
Miller was actually an interpretation, not a straightforward application.210
204. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505(1) (LexisNexis 2009) ("Unless otherwise authorized by
law, a person may not carry a loaded firearm: (a) in or on a vehicle; (b) on any public street; or (c) in
a posted prohibited area.").
205. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1280-81.
206. 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West 2009).
207. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1282.
208. Id. (exclamation point added).
209. Id. at 1282-83.
210. Id. at 1282:
[S]ee also Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (referring to Miller's
implicit rejection of traditional individual rights position); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d
120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Since [Miller], the lower federal courts have uniformly held
that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right."); United
States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (interpreting Miller to stand for rule
that, absent reasonable relationship to preservation of well-regulated militia, there is no
fundamental right to possess fireari); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th
Cir. 1977) (analyzing Miller and concluding that "ltlo apply the amendment so as to
guarantee appellant's right to keep an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to
have any connection to the militia, merely because he is technically a member of the
Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or policy") ....
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Then-then it came. The citation signal that must not be used. The
citation signal that never had been used in a quarter century of Second
Amendment cases: but see.
Apparently there was somebody who disagreed with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the Second Amendment and Miller. And that
someone was not a convicted felon who thought that the Second
Amendment guaranteed his absolute right to manufacture unregistered
explosives for gangs and not pay taxes on the machine guns he kept at
his meth lab so they would be handy when he went to stalk his ex-wife in
violation of a protective order.
but see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 (5th Cir. 2001)
(reading Miller as indecisive and, at best, supporting an individual's
right to bear arms).
211
At that point, the glasnost had gone far enough. The opinion returned to
familiar ground, the four part militia test from Haney. Parker never
claimed to be in the Utah militia, or that his revolver was connected to
militia service, so he had no Second Amendment rights.212
As for Parker's argument that the Tenth Circuit should follow
Emerson, the panel explained that it could not deviate from Tenth Circuit
precedent. And besides, most of the other Circuits still adhered to the
anti-individual version of the Second Amendment.1 3
Moreover, even if Emerson's interpretation of Miller were correct
(that the case turned on whether a short shotgun was a weapon suitable
for the militia, and not on whether Miller was a member of the militia),
Parker would still lose, since his gun was not a military type gun. "To
the contrary, at trial, Officer Michael Palhegyi, who was part of the mili-
tary police unit that took Parker into custody, testified that Parker's fire-
arm was 'not considered a military grade weapon' and, instead, more
commonly was used for personal defense or target practice.,
214
Heller, of course, viewed Miller differently, as standing only for the
permissibility of bans on the types of weapons not typically possessed
for legitimate purposes by law-abiding citizens. 21 5  The specific gun
211. Id. at 1283.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1284. The listing of cases from the other Circuits separated the militia-only cases
(including those of the Tenth Circuit) from the collective right cases. This was the first recognition
that militia-only and collective right were two entirely different theories. Some previous Tenth
Circuit opinions had failed to recognize that the two theories are incompatible. See supra text ac-
companying notes 119-20. What they have in common is that they both negate the Second Amend-
ment as a right for all (collective right) or for more than ninety-nine percent (militia-only) of the
American population.
214. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284.
215. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815-16 (2008) ("We therefore read
Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically pos-
sessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as shorl-barreled shotguns.").
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which Mr. Heller wanted to register in D.C. was a revolver, and the Hel-
ler Court found his gun to be protected by the Second Amendment.
Even under the military-arms reading of Miller, a revolver might well be
protected; although it is not currently used by the U.S. military, it has
been in the past. The Miller language, about the type of gun, did not ask
whether the gun was current equipment for the U.S. standing army; the
question was whether the gun could be of use to the militia using "arms
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.,
216
(A revolver has been "in common use" in the United States ever since its
invention in the 1830s.)217
Judge Kelly joined in the Parker opinion, except for the part involv-
ing the Second Amendment. He explained that the case could be decided
on much simpler grounds: "I would affirm the conviction by simply not-
ing that the obvious purpose of this prosecution-restricting concealed
weapons on a military base to identified military personnel-is a reason-
able restriction and thus does not contravene the Second Amendment.,
218
Judge Kelly then surveyed the record of Tenth Circuit panels which
had made sweeping pronouncements against Second Amendment rights,
"[a]lthough not required by the cases before them" and in violation of
"the universal admonition to decide constitutional issues narrowly."
First came Oakes. Then in Baer, a case involving a convicted felon with
machine guns, the panel claimed that only militia members had Second
Amendment rights. The opinion ignored a much easier rationale for the
desired result of upholding Baer's conviction: "Regardless of the fact
that a machine gun might be useful in a well regulated militia, it is ap-
parent that a felon would not be." Haney, another machine gun case, had
introduced the four-part test, which Judge Kelly characterized as "clearly
dicta." "The court (without any record support) speculated that a
'well-regulated' militia is one actively maintained and trained by the
state. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165-66. ' '2l9
Judge Kelly observed that "Our subsequent cases have applied this
test, though not needed in the context of restricted persons or devices, to
conclude that no Second Amendment violation occurred.,
220
As for Graham, "if one had a wild imagination," Judge Kelly ob-
served, the licensing requirement for explosive dealers "could be viewed
as involving a restriction on a weapon .... The court correctly noted
that even assuming a defense was stated, Second Amendment rights are
subject to reasonable governmental restrictions." Unfortunately, the
Graham court had used, as an alternative basis for the decision, the Ha-
216. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
217. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA 203, 242 (2006).
218. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285 (Kelly, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 1286-87.
220. Id. at 1287 (emphasis added).
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ney test, which was "totally unnecessary to the holding." In Bayles (pro-
hibiting gun possession following a protective order), the panel's appli-
cation of the Haney test (that Bayles was not in a militia, etc.) were pre-
sented "gratuitously." "[T]he bottom line was that the statute was a rea-
sonable restriction that did not infringe Second Amendment rights. Re-
gardless of the Haney test, defendant was a restricted person and could
not possess a weapon. ' 1
In short,
All of these cases involved uniform, federal restrictions on various
types of firearms or uniform, federal restrictions on the persons pos-
sessing such firearms. Whether the Second Amendment right is an
individual right or a collective right has not been decided by the Su-
preme Court-Miller did not define this aspect of the Second
Amendment right, and we need not reach the issue here.
222
Like this court, the Fifth Circuit recognized reasonable restrictions on
the Second Amendment right are constitutional. This case also can
be decided on that narrow basis-there is no need to dilute prema-
turely what many consider to be one of the most important amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.
223
Judge Kelly's concurring opinion was vindicated in Heller: bans on
particularly dangerous arms and particularly dangerous people are con-
sistent with the Second Amendment. The previous Tenth Circuit panels
had asserted that only militiamen have Second Amendment rights; even
those militiamen's rights were so narrowly circumscribed (according to
the previous panels) that it was hard to imagine why the Founders would
have bothered to waste a whole Amendment on such a miniscule "right."
Judge Kelly's opinion apparently was persuasive to several of his
colleagues. Previously, Judges Anderson, Briscoe, Murphy, Lucero, and
Murphy had written on or joined in opinions which "gratuitously" de-
clared the Second Amendment to be inapplicable to almost the entire
American public. Post-Parker, each of these judges wrote or joined opi-
nions which rejected Second Amendment claims being raised by particu-
lar litigants, but did so on narrow grounds, without denigrating the
Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens.
221. Id. at 1287.
222. Id. at 1288. Judge Kelly also discussed of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Printz, and
the split of Emerson (5th Circuit, Standard Model) vs. Silveira (9th Circuit, "collective right"). Id.
(citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002);
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003)). Emerson
and Silveira are virtually alone as pre-Heller Circuit Court of Appeal decisions involving in-depth
analysis of the original meaning of the Second Amendment and of Supreme Court precedent.
223. Id.
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XVI. EASTERLING: AFFIRMING THE FELON BAN WHILE RESPECTING THE
SECOND AMENDMENT
Easterling was convicted of possessing a firearm after having been
previously convicted of a felony; he was sentenced to 235 months in
prison. 224 He argued that the federal felon in possession statute is un-
constitutional because it amends the Second Amendment but did not go
through the ratification process for an amendment. The Tenth Circuit
disagreed, with a cite to Baer.
Notably, Judge Briscoe's opinion, joined by Judges Lucero and
Murphy, simply cited the holding in Baer (that the felon in possession
ban is constitutional), without repeating or adverting to Baer's verbiage
about only the militia having Second Amendment rights.225 This was the
type of approach that Judge Kelly had urged in his Parker concur-
rence.
226
XVII. CARPENTER: A RETURN TO GRATUITOUS DENIGRATION
Carpenter was convicted of possessing a firearm in Wyoming in
furtherance of his distribution of methamphetamine.22 7 His Second
Amendment claim was rejected since he had not preserved it for ap-
peal. 228
The case could have ended there, but Carpenter was written by
Judge Ebel, the Tenth Circuit's staunchest foe of Second Amendment
rights, and the author of the four-part Haney test. So in a footnote, Judge
Ebel, joined by Judges McKay and Henry, wrote that "we repeatedly
have held that to prevail on a Second Amendment challenge, a party
must show that possession of a firearm is in connection with participa-
tion in a 'well-regulated' 'state' 'militia.' '229 But "Mr. Carpenter claims
only that the firearm was for 'protection of my family, home and proper-
ty'; thus, he could not prevail on a Second Amendment claim even if not
waived. 2 30
Heller, of course, decided just the opposite. Protection of family,
home, and property is the core of the Second Amendment.
231
224. United States v. Easterling, No. 04-6341, 137 F. App'x. 143, 144, 2005 WL 1499755, at
*I (10th Cir. June 24, 2005) (unpublished).
225. Id. at 147.
226. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1287 (Kelly, J., concurring).
227. United States v. Carpenter, No. 05-8010, 163 F. App'x. 707, 708-09, 2006 WL 122476
(10th Cir. Jan. 18, 2006) (unpublished).
228. Id. at 711.
229. Id. at 711 n.l (quoting Parker, 362 F.3d at 1283).
230. Id.
231. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (explaining that citizens can consti-
tutionally own firearms for "the core lawful purpose of self-defense").
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XVHI. BASTIBLE: TREATING THE RIGHT TO ARMS AS A NORMAL RIGHT
Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co. was a factually complex tort case
brought by employees of a contractor at a Weyerhaeuser paper mill in
232Valiant, Oklahoma. The suit involved the right to arms under the Ok-
lahoma Constitution, not under the Second Amendment. It is worth
some attention, however, as an illustration of how the Tenth Circuit was
able to address a right to arms case in a manner which treated the right to
arms as a normal right.
In October 2002, the mill's security staff obtained the assistance of
the local sheriff to use trained detection dogs for mass, warrantless
searches of employee cars in the company parking lot which was open to
the public, and which was used by customers of a nearby Wal-Mart and
golf course. Although the sheriff had been told that the searches would
be only for drugs, Weyerhaeuser used the dogs to also search for guns.
A dozen employees had guns in their cars, and there was no dispute that
the guns were owned for lawful purposes, such as for going hunting after
work, or for protection while traveling to and from work. (One em-
ployee had driven his father's car to work that day, and did not know it
contained a gun.) All the employees were fired for violating company
policy, and they then sued.233
The case involved a variety of tort and employment law issues, plus
state action issues related to the sheriff.
At the time, an Oklahoma statute gave employers unlimited power
to ban guns on company property.234 But the public reaction to Weyer-
haeuser's actions was near-universal outrage. The automobile searches
had been conducted at the beginning of hunting season.235 If the auto-
mobile searches were not an attempt to find a pretext to fire as many
employees as possible, the company did a good job of conveying a con-
trary impression. The Oklahoma legislature promptly passed-by a vote
of 92-4 in the House and 41-0 in the Senate-a statute prohibiting em-
ployer bans of guns in employee cars in company parking lots.
236
232. 437 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2006).
233. Id. at 1001-03.
234. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.22 (2001), amended by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.22(B)
(2004).
235. Amy Haimerl & Malika Zouhali-Worrall, The right to bear guns at work,
CNNMoNEY.coM, June 27, 2008, http:/Imoney.cnn.com/2008/O6/05/smallbusiness/
guns -at work.fsb/.
236. 2004 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 39 (H.B. 2122 West). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1290.22(B) (West 2009) ("No person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity shall be
permitted to establish any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person, except a con-
victed felon, from transporting and storing firearms in a locked vehicle on any property set aside for
any vehicle."). The voting record is available via Oklahoma Legislative Service Bureau Bill Track-
ing Reports Website, http://webserverl.lsb.state.ok.usWebBillStatus/main.html (click on "Basic
Search Form" on the left side of the screen; on the "Basic Search Form" enter "HB 2122" in the
"Measure Number(s)" box and under the "Session" box scroll down to "2004 Regular Session" and
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Oklahoma-even in comparison to its neighbors of Kansas, Arkan-
sas, Texas, Colorado, and New Mexico-has a very strong culture of gun
rights and hunting. Oklahoma also has a very strong tradition of suspi-
cion of corporations, as exemplified by a state constitution which con-
tains more restrictions on corporate power than any other American state
constitution.237 Could anything provoke a greater backlash by the people
of Oklahoma than a big business firing employees under a pretext be-
cause the employees were going hunting after work? Perhaps the only
way that Weyerhaeuser, which ended up with only four defenders in the
state legislature, could have made itself even more unpopular would have
been if the corporation had defiled the grave of Will Rogers.
But for the Tenth Circuit, the issue was whether Weyerhaeuser had
acted legally, under the law as it existed before the changes made by the
Oklahoma legislature. That law had provided:
"Nothing contained in any provision of the Oklahoma Self-Defense
Act... shall be construed to limit, restrict or prohibit in any manner
the existing rights of any person, property owner, tenant, employer,
or business entity to control the possession of weapons on any prop-
erty owned or controlled by the person or business entity."
2 3 8
Weyerhaeuser's use of the statute to fire employees for hunting
guns locked in cars in an employee parking lot was (obviously) a gross
violation of the social consensus about how a corporation should behave,
but the parking lot ban was within the literal ambit of the statute.
The Plaintiffs argued that the pre-amendment law "provides no sup-
port for Weyco's firearms policy because the statute, by its terms, only
protects the 'existing rights.., to control the possession of weapons' on
its property, and Weyco had no 'existing right' to do something which
interferes with the fundamental and preeminent right to bear arms. 2 39
The Bastible court disagreed. First of all, the Oklahoma state con-
stitution explicitly authorized limits on the carrying of arms.2 ° Second,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court had ruled that some regulation of the right
to arms was permissible. 241 Thus, the statute allowing businesses to ban
click "Retrieve"). In 2009, the Tenth Circuit rejected a lawsuit challenging the validity of the park-
ing lot reforms. See discussion infra Part XVIii.
237. Article 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution contains forty-eight sections (a few of which have
been repealed) imposing limits on corporate power, and providing for strong government regulation
of corporate activity. OKLA. CoNsT. art. 9 §§ 1-48.
238. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1290.22 (West 2009).
239. Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir. 2006).
240. Id. (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 26 (stating that "nothing herein contained shall pre-
vent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.")).
241. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Okla. State Bureau of Investigation v. Warren, 975 P.2d 900, 902
(Okla. 1998)).
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guns on business property was, in the Tenth Circuit's view, a "reasonable
regulation. 242
Under Oklahoma law, an at-will employee may prevail in a wrong-
ful discharge suit if he was fired for "performing an act consistent with a
clear and compelling public policy." 243 As the Tenth Circuit noted, "The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has, however, cautioned that this 'unique tort'
applies 'to only a narrow class of cases and must be tightly circum-
scribed.'"24
The plaintiffs argued that the firing violated the clear and compel-
ling public policy of "the right to keep arms espoused by the Oklahoma
Constitution., 245 The Tenth Circuit, admitting that there was no direct
Oklahoma precedent, decided
we are confident that those courts would not embrace that view. As
indicated, both the Oklahoma Constitution and the Oklahoma courts
recognize that the right to bear arms is not unlimited, and, indeed,
may be regulated. We agree with the district court that "[g]iven the
finding by [the Oklahoma Supreme] Court that the right to keep arms
is not unfettered, establishing a wrongful discharge tort for exercising
a statutorily sanctioned restriction on the right would be counterintui-
tive."
, 246
XlX. HUGGINS: REJECTING AN ABSURD SECOND AMENDMENT CLAIM
WITHOUT REJECTING THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Paul Huggins was an obvious nut who brought pro se suits against a
church, two pastors, and Safeway.247 His complaints raised, inter alia,
Second Amendment claims, although they were no more coherent than
the rest of his pleadings. For example:
Mr. Huggins's complaint alleges that, while he was paying for gas at
a Safeway store, a Safeway employee allowed other customers to
have access to personal information on his credit card. According to
Mr. Huggins, the employee "stated directly to me that I, am Penetra-
tion against you and I, am Penetration against all Black People" and
told him that he was not allowed to come back into the store. Rec.
doc. 3, at 2. Mr. Huggins asserts that this conduct violated his First
and Second Amendment rights and his right to equal protection.
248
242. Id.
243. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,29 (Okla. 1989).
244. Bastible, 437 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Bd., 29
P.3d 543, 545 (Okla. 2001)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1008.
247. Huggins v. Safeway, No. 06-1423, 210 F. App'x. 819, 2007 WL 4214 (10th Cir. Jan. 2,
2007) (unpublished); Huggins v. Hilton, No. 05-1466, 180 F. App'x. 814, 2006 WL 1389086 (10th
Cir. May 18, 2006) (per curiam).
248. Huggins v. Safeway, 210 F. App'x. at 820.
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In two separate cases, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court dis-
missals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In
contrast to how the Tenth Circuit had treated some extremely weak
Second Amendment claims in the past, the panels did not use the Hug-
gins cases as an opportunity to announce a broad declaration against
Second Amendment rights.
XX. ARLEDGE: CONTINUING TO FOLLOW JUDGE KELLY'S NEW
APPROACH
Arledge was convicted of possessing a gun and ammunition while
he was subject to a protective order.249 He appealed pro se, after his ap-
pointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief250 stating that there were
no arguable issues for appeal.
In a decision written by Judge O'Brien, and joined by Judges Kelly
and Tymkovich, the Tenth Circuit rejected Arledge's Second Amend-
ment claim. The panel cited Tenth Circuit precedent in a manner consis-
tent with Judge Kelly's approach in Parker: as affirming the particular
gun control, and without gratuitous attacks on the Second Amendment
rights of the law-abiding:
Arledge argues his conviction under § 922(g)(8) violates the Second
Amendment. As both Arledge's counsel and the government correct-
ly note, § 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment. United
States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 2002); see also
United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 2000) (conclud-
ing defendant's § 922(g)(1) conviction (felon-in-possession of a fire-
arm) did not violate the Second Amendment).
2 51
After Parker, the Tenth Circuit had handed down five decisions in
cases involving the right to arms. (Four under the Second Amendment,
and one under the Oklahoma Constitution.) In four of the five cases, the
Circuit panel had followed the approach urged by Judge Kelly in the
Parker case: the panels had decided whether the right to arms had been
violated in the particular case. The panels did not propound broad deci-
sions asserting that the right to arms was a nullity. Only one decision,
written by Judge Ebel, had reverted to the pre-glasnost style, and had
used a criminal's obviously frivolous Second Amendment claim as an
excuse to declare that there were, in effect, no Second Amendment rights
for anyone.
249. United States v. Arledge, No. 04-5161, 220 F. App'x. 864, 865-66, 2007 WL 987398
(10th Cir. Apr. 4, 2007) (unpublished).
250. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that appointed criminal defense
counsel may withdraw after trial if the counsel files a brief showing that there is nothing in the
record which might support a non-frivolous appeal).
251. Arledge, 220 F. App'x. at 869.
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Perhaps if the Supreme Court had not granted certiorari in Heller,
the Tenth Circuit might eventually have taken a Second Amendment case
en banc; confined Oakes, Haney, and similar cases to their facts; and
followed the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit in acknowledging that
ordinary law-abiding Americans do have Second Amendment rights.
XXI. COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY: USING THE SECOND
AMENDMENT TO PROTECT THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The first post-Heller case in the Tenth Circuit to involve the Second
Amendment was Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, a First
Amendment challenge to a state law which gave Colorado residents
scholarships to in-state private universities, but which excluded "perva-
sively sectarian" universities 2
The State argued that its funding decisions, even those that discri-
minate on the basis of religion, are subject only to rational basis review.
The Court rejected this argument, and cited, inter alia, the Heller deci-
sion:
That First Amendment challenges to selective funding would be sub-
ject only to rational basis scrutiny seems especially unlikely after
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, [] (2008). There the court noted that ra-
tional basis scrutiny had been applied only to "constitutional com-
mands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws." In con-
trast, the Court said that "[o]bviously the same test could not be used
to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against
double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear
arms. If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear
arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redun-
dant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws,
and would have no effect." Id. (internal citation omitted). The same
goes, we assume, for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 253
The Second Amendment was, finally, no longer the "orphan of the Bill
of Rights.2 54 Now, it is a real member of the constitutional family-
indeed, such a strong member that teachings about the Second Amend-
ment could be used to defeat efforts to prevent careful judicial scrutiny of
alleged infringements of First Amendment rights.
252. 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
253. Id. at 1255, n.2.
254. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519, n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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XXII. RAMSEY WINCH V. HENRY: THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS LIKE THE
RIGHT TO PETITION
The Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co. case, discussed supra, observed
that the Oklahoma legislature had (subsequent to the events involved in
the case) enacted reforms to forbid employers from firing employees for
storing lawfully-owned guns in the employees' locked cars in a company
parking lot. Several corporations filed a suit in federal district court in
Oklahoma against the new law-although several of the plaintiffs
dropped out after the National Rifle Association announced a boycott of
Conoco, which was one of the plaintiffs.
The heart of the lawsuit was the claim that the Oklahoma law was
preempted by the federal Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA),
which has a general requirement that employers maintain a safe
workplace. Plaintiffs also raised various constitutional claims. They
won on the OSHA claim in district court, but the Tenth Circuit unanim-
ously reversed. 55
The OSHA claim failed because the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration had never promulgated any regulation against guns in the
workplace (let alone in parking lots). 256 Indeed, OHS Administration
itself had written to the Tenth Circuit to affirm that the OSHA statute and
regulations did nothing to preempt the Oklahoma law. 7
The Tenth Circuit rejected the claim that the parking lot law was a
"taking" of the corporations' property. Rather, corporations were simply
required not to interfere with citizens' exercise of their own rights. The
case was similar to PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.25 8 There, the
U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a California statute which prevented
shopping center owners from prohibiting the circulation of petitions in
the shopping center. "As in PruneYard, Plaintiffs have not suffered an
unconstitutional infringement of their property rights, but rather are re-
quired by the Amendments to recognize a state-protected right of their
employees (noting that the state may exercise its police power to adopt
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution). As such, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not suffered a
,,259per se taking.
Nor was there a regulatory taking, because the corporations suffered
no economic loss, and no diminution of their investment-based expecta-
tions. Besides, even if there had been some economic effect, regulations
generally do not constitute takings when the regulations are "laws meant
255. Ramsey Winch v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009). The opinion was written by
Judge Baldock, and joined by Judges Henry and McConnell.
256. Id. at 1204-08.
257. Id. at 1207 n. 9.
258. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
259. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1209 (citation omitted).
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to support the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the entire
community."26
Finally, there was the claim that the parking lot law was a due
process violation because it was irrational. The Tenth Circuit disagreed:
One professed purpose of the Amendments is the protection of the
broader Oklahoma community. We need not decide the long-running
debate as to whether allowing individuals to carry firearms enhances
or diminishes the overall safety of the community. The very fact that
this question is so hotly debated, however, is evidence enough that a
rational basis exists for the Amendments.
261
In addition, the parking lot law was rational because it was an effort
to expand the protection of Second Amendment rights. One could argue
that parking lot reforms "are simply meant to expand (or secure) the
Second Amendment right to bear arms. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81,
100 S. Ct. 2035 (noting that the state may exercise its police power to
adopt individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution). Because we cannot say the Amendments have no
reasonably conceivable rational basis, Plaintiffs' due process claim must
fail."
2 62
As in Colorado Christian University, the Second Amendment's ap-
pearance in Ramsey Winch was brief, but it did show that the Second
Amendment is now a normal part of constitutional law, and that cases
involving other rights, such as the right to petition, may be useful in
Second Amendment analysis.
CONCLUSION
From 1977 until 2004, the Tenth Circuit's record of Second
Amendment cases was a disgrace to the rule of law.
It was not a disgrace for wrong results. Almost all the decisions in-
volved restrictions on narrow classes of especially dangerous weapons,
or the prohibition of gun ownership for people who had proven them-
selves to be dangerous. Most of these results are presumptively valid
under Heller, and most of the rest are in no worse than a gray zone of
validity. Even pre-Heller, almost all the decisions could, as Judge Kelly
observed in Parker, have been written on the narrow grounds of uphold-
ing legitimate, narrowly tailored restrictions on the Second Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence was not a disgrace because it
adopted a militia-only theory of the Second Amendment. Personally, I
think that militia-only theory is much weaker than the Standard Model of
260. Id. at 1210.
261. Id. at 1211.
262. Id.
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the Second Amendment. But as Justice Stevens's dissent in Heller dem-
onstrated, there was surely some authority which could be read as sup-
porting the militia-only interpretation. The militia-only interpretation
was, whatever its flaws, at least intellectually coherent at a surface level,
and was thus far superior to the oxymoronic "collective right" embraced
by some other circuits.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's militia-only version of the Second
Amendment was based almost entirely on the major Supreme Court
precedent, United States v. Miller. Today, we know that Miller was the
product of a collusive, dishonest conspiracy organized by a U.S. Attor-
ney, and that the federal district judge and the defense counsel were will-
ing participants in his unethical scheme.263 But the Tenth Circuit did not
know that. The Miller opinion is (perhaps deliberately) oblique and va-
gue. When the decision is analyzed in careful detail, there are portions
which support the interpretation of Justice Scalia and the Standard Mod-
el, and there are portions which can support the interpretation of Justice
Stevens and the Oakes line of cases. The Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence
cannot be called a disgrace because it ultimately ended up on the "4" side
of a 5-4 Supreme Court decision. 264 Although militia-only was a weaker
theory, it was not a preposterous theory, or a theory bereft of any intel-
lectual support.
The reason that the Tenth Circuit's Second Amendment cases were
a disgrace is that they barely had any reasoning. If you take everything
that the Tenth Circuit wrote about the Second Amendment in Oakes
(1977) and the twenty-five years of cases thereafter, the whole thing
combined would not add up to a mediocre student Note in a secondary
journal at an unaccredited law school.
Even the lowliest of student Notes must at least attempt to address
the most important arguments on the other side. Especially when those
contrary arguments come from the U.S. Supreme Court's explication of
the very text that is at issue. Or from enactments of the Congress of the
United States. Or from the Yale Law Journal, the Michigan Law Review,
or Larry Tribe, Akhil Amar, or Sanford Levinson. A mediocre student
Note would not address all these sources, but it would address at least a
couple. The Tenth Circuit spent a quarter century pretending there were
no serious contrary authorities.
Nobody forced the Tenth Circuit to propound a grand theory of the
Second Amendment without being able to make a serious intellectual
defense of the theory. As Judge Kelly pointed out, almost all the Second
Amendment cases that came to the Tenth Circuit could have been han-
263. See Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
48, 56 (2008) (cited in Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814 (2008)).
264. The collective right, on the other hand, got zero votes from nine Justices. See supra text
accompanying note 13.
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died simply by addressing whether they involved legitimate restrictions
on the right. It was a deliberate choice of the Tenth Circuit to reach out
in Oakes, and to, in effect, declare that an entire Amendment to the Bill
of Rights was a nullity, insofar as its protection of 99.9% of the Ameri-
can people.
It was the choice of the Tenth Circuit to continue to declare its
Second Amendment decisions in the sweeping, nullificationist terms of
Oakes. If the Circuit were determined to proceed on such a broad front,
then the Circuit owed the American people a real justification of its ac-
tions. Not the pompous ipse dixit of Haney, Oakes, and the other cases,
but a serious explanation. An explanation which addressed the best ar-
guments on the other side.
That the Tenth Circuit never did so perhaps reflected a lack of intel-
lectual self-confidence. The Tenth Circuit is a good example of Sanford
Levinson's observation that some elements of the legal elite refused to
intellectually engage with the Second Amendment because of "a mixture
of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns and the per-
haps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even 'winning,'
interpretations of the Second Amendment would present real hurdles to
those of us supporting prohibitory regulation. 265
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit took the post-Lopez challenges on in-
terstate commerce grounds seriously. A reader may agree or disagree
with those decisions (and I tend to disagree) but those decisions are de-
tailed, and replete with lengthy, intricate arguments, and sophisticated
doctrinal analysis. They read like legitimate appellate opinions. They
read like legal opinions. "Because I said so" is not a legitimate jurispru-
dential tool. Legal reasoning is supposed to include reasoning.
Why was the Tenth Circuit's approach to the Second Amendment
so lawless?
One might speculate that none of the Second Amendment litigants
were very attractive. The best of the bunch was Parker, who was a law-
abiding, decent man who just forgot to take a handgun out of his truck
one day. As for the rest, the cream of the crop was Haney, an otherwise
law-abiding man whose version of the Second Amendment was closer to
what might be found in a Robert Heinlein science fiction novel than in
American legal practice. After Haney, we descend into a group of meth
dealers, stalkers, convicted felons, explosives dealers for gangsters, and
other miscreants. Not a very attractive bunch.
But courts, including the Tenth Circuit, routinely understand that
the courts must deal with the scurrilous characters in a way that protects
the rights of the good people. When the courts protect the speech rights
265. Levinson, supra note 183, at 642.
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of Nazis, the free speech of thoughtful but unpopular minorities is pro-
tected. When courts require a retrial of a patently guilty criminal be-
cause the jury instructions were defective, the right of the mistakenly-
accused to accurate jury instructions is protected. And so on.
Thus, the unattractive nature of the Second Amendment claimants
in the Tenth Circuit cannot be the full explanation of why the Circuit's
treatment of the Second Amendment was so atrocious. It is hard to es-
cape the inference that many judges on the Circuit were viscerally hostile
to gun ownership. The Tenth Circuit's first case on the Second Amend-
ment, Oakes, involved a member of a racist, anti-Jewish organization;
another case involved an anti-Mormon bigot. Sadly, the three decades of
Tenth Circuit cases involving the Second Amendment appear to have
involved not only some bigoted defendants, but an unfortunate number
of bigoted judges.266
266. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 CONST. COMM. 395, 399-
400 (1991) (observing that in the world of the legal elite, expressions of bigotry against gun owners
are treated as conventional wisdom, whereas similar bigotry expressed against a racial group would
be considered highly offensive); Michael Lerner, Respectable Bigotry, 38 AM. SCHOLAR 606 (1969).

